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JURIES AND EXPERT EVIDENCE*
Neil Vidmart & Shari Seidman Diamond'
I. FROM THE NINETEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
In Albany County, New York, in 1853, John
Hendrickson was accused of poisoning his wife, Maria, with
aconitine, also known as wolfbane.1  The circumstantial
evidence was pretty damning. Their marriage was very rocky
and Maria was planning to return to live with her mother.
Hendrickson had numerous liaisons with other women and had
seriously assaulted one of them. Witnesses testified to his
unsavory character. In hindsight, the earlier death of their
infant son appeared suspicious. Albany druggists tentatively
identified the defendant as a purchaser of aconitine and
testified that he had inquired about prussic acid, another
poison. Other evidence contradicted Hendrickson's claim that
he woke in the middle of the night to find Maria dead.
The circumstantial evidence, however, was probably
insufficient to convict, and a medical expert for the prosecution
provided key evidence. James H. Salisbury was only twenty-
©2001 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond. All Rights Reserved. This
research was supported, in part, by State Justice Institute Grant SJI-97-N-247,
National Science Foundation Grant SBR 9818806, and research funds from Duke Law
School and from the American Bar Foundation.
t Ph.D.; Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law and Professor of
Psychology, Duke University.
tt Ph.D.; J.D.; Professor of Law and Psychology, Northwestern University,
Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation.
1 This case is described and analyzed in detail in JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS
AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 122-139
(1993). This synopsis of the case and quotations are taken from Mohr's more lengthy
account.
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eight years old, but he held a medical degree and had a medical
practice. He had previously testified in two trials. Perhaps
most important of all, he had conducted research on aconitine.
Salisbury testified that the deceased's intestines contained that
poison. Salisbury was providing novel scientific evidence since
prior research on aconitine and similar substances had been
unable to detect it once it had entered body tissues. Two other
medical experts, including one John Swineburn, also gave
evidence consistent with poisoning. Defense experts disputed
the findings but for several reasons they were poor witnesses.
In closing arguments to the jury a lead member of the
prosecution team drew attention to the fact that many
prominent members of the Albany medical profession had
attended the trial as observers, but none had come forward to
refute the prosecution witnesses, thus strongly implying that
the findings were generally accepted by the medical
community. Hendrickson was convicted.
The publicity generated by the trial led to a major
examination of the triars evidence by the medical and scientific
community throughout the United States and Europe. In
scientific articles in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal,
the American Journal of the Medical Sciences, and elsewhere,
an overwhelming majority of the scientific community
concluded that Salisbury's failure to preserve the key evidence
was unforgivable, that his methodology was flawed, that there
were alternative explanations for his findings, and that his
conclusions were inconsistent with or contradicted by research
findings of other authors. In short, the evidence lacked
scientific reliability.
Charles A. Lee, a prominent and influential professor
of pathology, reviewed the trial transcript and drew attention
to the "confident and positive" demeanor of Salisbury and
Swineburn as witnesses.2 Lee asserted that it was probable
that their testimony had a greater influence on the jury than
"the more careful and judicious testimony ... of men of age,
professional skill and enlarged experience" who had testified
2 JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAw 134 (1993) (quoting Charles A.
Lee, Review of Barnes and Hevenor, Trial of John Hendrikson, Jr., for the Murder of
His Wife by Poisoning, at Bethlehem, Albany County, New York, Mar. 6, 1853, 8 AM. J.
OF MED. SCIS. 176 (1854)).
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for the defense.3 In the final line of his article in the American
Journal of Medical Sciences, Lee concluded that the
Hendrickson case "makes us question, at times, whether the
boasted right and privilege of trial by jury, be, indeed, a
blessing or a curse."
The Hendrickson case raises some interesting points
about juries and experts. The overwhelming scientific majority
opinion about the state of knowledge of aconitine was
generated by litigation. The scientific majority opinion'
developed after the jury's verdict was rendered, and courts of
appeal were not willing to revisit the issue: Hendrickson was
hanged in 1854. The experts propounding the novel scientific
evidence were accused of professional careerism. The expert
evidence, while probably central in this case, was situated in
the midst of other evidence bearing on the defendant's guilt.
The jury was accused of relying on superficial characteristics of
the expert witnesses rather than on the substance of the
evidence.
The Hendrickson case was the major toxicology trial of
the nineteenth century, but it was far from unique in raising
questions about the competence, gullibility, and irre-
sponsibility of juries faced with expert evidence. Kenneth
DeVille's study of medical malpractice in the nineteenth
century provides a number of examples of juries being accused
of not understanding expert evidence.' After a German laborer
in Buffalo was awarded $600, one commentator stated:
Evidence of a single man, contradicting all surgical experience, and
evidently based on an egregious error in diagnosis, outweighed the
opinions of older and better surgeons, and subjected a poor,
hardworking and intelligent practitioner to a judgment and costs
heavy enough to sweep away the greater portion of the small
earnings of many years.!
3 Id.
4 Id.
Opinion was not unanimous. A professor of forensic medicine at the Royal
College of Surgeons in Dublin, Ireland offered an opinion that the post-mortem results
were consistent with four reports of aconite (the crucial chemical in aconitine)
poisoning that had come to his attention.
See generally KENNETH A. DEVILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AiERICA: ORIGINs AND LEGACY (1990).
7 Id. at 28.
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In an 1847 editorial in the Boston Medical and
Surgical Journal, another commentator decried the "glorious
uncertainty of legal justice and medical testimony" and
asserted that conflicting medical testimony "bewildered" lay
juries.8 We will return to the Hendrickson case later in this
Article, but let us move forward approximately a century and a
half to contemporary debate about juries and experts.
In his widely read books on the tort system, author
Peter Huber offered charges, backed by anecdote, that "junk
science," is currently offered to incompetent juries who make
superficial judgments about experts, and whose intellectual
inadequacies are compounded by juries' alleged natural
sympathies for plaintiffs over defendants.9 Similarly, in her
angry book about the tort system arising out of her personal
involvement with breast implant litigation, Marcia Angell
asserted that in tort cases verdicts by judges:
[Wlould almost certainly be sounder than those made by juries,
because judges are educated to be dispassionate and to evaluate
evidence. Many tort cases involve expert witnesses, who speak to
fairly technical matters. To evaluate whether a product has caused a
disease is difficult for nearly anyone. For a jury it is especially
difficult, because its members usually have no competence in the
area. They are often left to make judgments largely on the basis of
the emotional appeals of the lawyers and their expert witnesses. 'o
The Daubert trilogy of Supreme Court cases" on
admissibility of scientific evidence has also brought forth many
negative assertions about how juries evaluate expert evidence.
Amicus briefs filed on behalf of the defendant in Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael, for example, made numerous appeals to the
authority of case law, 2 trial manuals, and popular authors in
8 Id. at 540.
See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988).
'0 MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 204 (1996).
" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also
Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
12 See, e.g., U.S. v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (asserting
that juries are unduly prejudiced, confused, or misled by expert testimony "because of
its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness").
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asserting the need for a judicial gate keeping role.'3 Consider a
partial sample of these assertions:
[G]atekeeping serves an important check on the jury's inclination to
give treat (and sometimes undue) deference to expert testimony
[Almong the difficulties that Judge Hand noted were that an expert
frequently ends up "confusing" the jury and effectively "take[s] the
jury's place if they believe him ....
[J]urors often "abdicate their fact-finding obligation" and simply
"adopt" the expert's opinion .... 16
But "because experts often deal with esoteric matters of great
complexity," jurors frequently are incapable of "critically evaluating
the bases of an expert's testimony" and too often give "unquestioning
deference to expert opinion."
17
[Because of the "aura of infallibility"] "even when jurors have a
'basis for questioning the expert's reliability [they] may be
disinclined to do so.' "'8
In Daubert and its progeny, the Supreme Court relied
on interpretations of the rules of evidence that mandate a
judicial gate-keeping role. In Daubert the Court did comment
on the respondent's concern that "befuddled juries are
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific
assertions" and countered that "[in this regard respondent
seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of
the jury and the adversary system generally.""9 Nevertheless,
the Court, by stressing the judge's role as gatekeeper, appears
implicitly to have assumed that the judge should protect the
jury. In 1999 Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., a federal court in
13 See Neil Vidmar et al., Amicus Brief Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, reprinted
in 24 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 387 (2000).
14 See generally Petitioner's Brief, Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999); see also Vidmar, supra note 13, at 389.
1 Vidmar, supra note 13, at 389
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96.
20011 1125
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
the Eleventh Circuit deciding a silicone implant case captured
the likely unstated assumptions underlying the Daubert
rulings:
While meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under
criticism for donning white coats and making determinations that
are outside their field of expertise, the Supreme Court has obviously
deemed this less objectionable than dumping a barrage of
questionable scientific evidence on a jury, who would be even less
equipped than the judge to make reliability and relevance
determinations and more likely than the judge to be awestruck by
the expert's mystique.
Thus, juries are alleged to be intellectually
incompetent to understand much expert evidence, to rely on
superficial characteristics of the experts in judging their
testimony, to abdicate their responsibility to evaluate the
testimony, and to be confused by a battle of experts.
It is important to observe at this juncture that over
the past half century some forms of expert evidence may have
increased in complexity and may be even more complex in the
future.21 Not all of this expert evidence is scientific or medical
evidence. Fraud cases concerning international transfers of
financial documents may entail expert evidence involving
many complicated arcana. Moreover, expert evidence is
sometimes enmeshed in other trial complexities that are
procedural in nature, such as joinder of cases in mass tort
actions. Furthermore, the adversary process that permits each
party to select its own experts often creates the impression that
expert opinion is evenly divided on an issue when in fact the
experts called by one side represent only a tiny minority of
20 Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). Note
that it is also possible that the Supreme Court's decisions reflect a desire to reduce
case dockets and make litigation more efficient because judicial gate-keeping can
eliminate cases at early stages in the litigation process and streamline those that
remain. Of course, this hypothesis is not incompatible with a belief that we need
safeguards from jury incompetence and irresponsibility.
21 See Joel Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues : Lessons
From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727, 733-36 (1991); Samuel R. Gross, Expert
Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1179-84 (1991) (hereinafter Gross, Expert
Evidence); Robert D. Myers et al., Complex Scientific Evidence and the Jury, 83
JUDICATURE 150, 152 (1999); Samuel R. Gross, Data on the Use of Expert Witnesses in
California Civil Trials (1990) (Unpublished paper on file with the authors and quoted
with permission of the author).
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professionals holding such opinions.' Finally, forms of evidence
concerning what has been called "social framework" testimony,
on topics puch as battered woman, rape trauma, or child sex
abuse accommodation syndrome, appeared infrequently in
trials-or not at all-as little as two decades ago, but are now
common. These developments have raised serious concerns
about whether jurors are unduly influenced by the experts who
proffer this testimony.
What is equally clear, however, is the fact that most of
the legal debate on how juries respond to experts, as the
Kumho case amicus briefs demonstrate, is based on assertions
and opinions rather than any systematic empirical base. Yet,
over the past twenty-five years social scientists have studied
the influence of experts on juror and jury behavior through
post-trial interviews with jurors, other forms of case study
methodology, and experimental simulations intended to isolate
factors that bear on jurors' decision-making processes. The
types of expert evidence examined in this body of literature are
diverse, and so are the contexts in which the evidence was
conveyed to the jurors.
The purpose of this Article is to examine what social
scientists have learned about how jurors handle expert
testimony. We begin in Part II by considering what the legal
system expects of jurors and what psychological research
suggests about laypersons' capacities and tendencies with
regard to these expectations. In Part III, we analyze what
jurors tell researchers in surveys and interviews about how
they react to experts. Part IV examines the findings from
simulation experiments designed to assess juror reactions to
various forms of expert testimony. To put the evaluation of jury
reactions to expert evidence in context, Part V examines how
judges handle similarly challenging evidence. Finally, Part VI
considers the strengths and weaknesses of the jury as an
evaluator of expert testimony, along with current efforts to
improve the quality of the jury's decisions about experts.
2Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1239 (1992).
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II. WHAT DOES THE LEGAL SYSTEM EXPECT JURORS TO DO
WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY?
A. Jury Instructions
Expert witnesses are permitted to offer scientific,
technical, and other specialized information that will assist the
trier of fact.23 Unlike ordinary fact witnesses, experts are
permitted to offer reports about behavior not involving the
parties in the case at hand, to give opinions, and to derive their
testimony from methods used by professionals in the expert's
field.24 As a result, jury instructions often provide additional
directions on how to evaluate and weigh expert testimony.
These instructions reveal how the legal system expects jurors
(and judges) to deal with the testimony of experts. Consider
some examples from the instructions that jurors are given,
beginning first with instructions for witnesses in general.
The federal pattern civil jury instructions are as
follows:
You, as jurors, are the sole judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight their testimony deserves.
You should carefully scrutinize all the testimony given, the
circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every
matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness is worthy
of belief. Consider each witness's intelligence, motive and state of
mind, and demeanor and manner while on the stand. Consider the
witness's ability to observe the matters as to which he has testified,
and whether he impresses you as having an accurate recollection of
these matters. Consider also any relation each witness may bear to
either side of the case; the manner in which each witness might be
affected by the verdict; and the extent to which, if at all, each
witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the
case....
In Arizona civil courts the pattern jury instructions for
witnesses in general are as follows:
23 FED. R. EVID. 702.
24 FED. R. EVID. 703.
1128 [Vol. 66: 4
JURIES AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
In deciding the facts of this case, you should consider what
testimony to accept, and what to reject. You may accept everything a
witness says, or part of it, or none of it.
In evaluating testimony, you should use the tests for
truthfulness that people use in determining matters of importance
in everyday life, including such facts as: the witness's ability to see
or hear or know the things the witness testified to; the quality of the
witness's memory; the witness's manner while testifying; whether
the witness had any motive, bias, or prejudice; whether the witness
was contradicted by anything the witness said or wrote before trial,
or by other evidence; and the reasonableness of the witness's
testimony when considered in the light of the other evidence.
Consider all of the evidence in the light of reason, common
sense, and experience.'
Both of these examples illustrate that legal
instructions direct jurors to consider both the basis for the
ordinary witness' knowledge and the trustworthiness of
ordinary witnesses. Thus, they refer both to the witness's
exposure to the facts about which he or she is testifying and to
potential motive, interest, and bias that may affect the
willingness of the witness to testify accurately about what he
or she knows (i.e., how trustworthy the witness is). More
ambiguously, the federal instruction mentions intelligence,
presumably because it may affect the witness's knowledge
base. It also mentions manner of testifying, because non-verbal
cues are believed to assist the juror in gauging the extent to
which the witness knows what he or she is talking about and
whether the witness is accurately reporting what is known. Of
course, we know that behavioral cues such as the witness's
apparent confidence can be powerful, but highly unreliable,
criteria in determining accuracy.26 Although these instructions
ARIZONA STATE BAR, REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CML) 6 (3d
ed. (1997) [hereinafter ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
21 See ELIZABETH F. LoFTus, EYEwrrNEss TESTIMONY 19, 100-01, 177 (1996);
Gary Wells et al., How do People Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory? Studies of
Performance and a Meta-Memory Analysis, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 41
(Sally Lloyd-Bostock ed., 1983); Gary Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence and Juror
Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440 (1979). For
the unreliable relation between expert opinion and confidence, see generally STEPHEN
CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOm: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF
CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY (1995); Robyn Dawes et al., Clinical versus Actuarial
Judgment 243 SCI. 1668 (1989); K.A. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and
Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
243 (1980); Benjamin Kleinmuntz, Why We Use Our Heads Instead of Formulas:
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omit a specific reference to the confidence of a witness, the
reference to demeanor and manner certainly would encompass
apparent confidence.
For expert witnesses, there are additional
elaborations. The federal instructions state:
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit witnesses to testify as
to their own opinions or their own conclusions about issues in the
case. An exception to this rule exists as to those witnesses who are
described as "expert witnesses." An "expert witness" is someone who,
by education or by experience, may have become knowledgeable in
some technical, scientific, or very specialized area. If such knowledge
or experience may be of assistance to you in understanding some of
the evidence or in determining a fact, an "expert witness" in that
area may state an opinion as to relevant and material matters in
which he or she claims to be an expert.
You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence
in this case and give it such weight as you may think it deserves.
You should consider the testimony of expert witnesses just as you
consider other evidence in this case. If you should decide that the
opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education
or experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in
support of the opinion are not sound, or if you should conclude that
the opinion is outweighed by other evidence [including that of other
"expert witnesses"], you may disregard the opinion in part or in its
entirety.
As I have told you several times, you-the jury-are the sole
judges of the facts in this case.27
In Arizona, the instructions for experts are as follows:
A witness qualified as an expert by education or experience
may state opinions on matters in that witness's field of expertise,
and may also state reasons for those opinions.
Expert opinion testimony should be judged just as any other
testimony. You are not bound by it. You may accept it or reject it, in
whole or in part, and you should give it as much weight as you think
it deserves, considering the witness's qualifications and experience,
the reasons given for the opinions, and all the other evidence in the
28
case.
Toward an Integrative Approach, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 296 (1990); Steven Penrod &
Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic
Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY, & L. 817 (1995).
27 Edward J. Devitt et al., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL)
§ 72.08 (4th ed. 1997).
ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 25, at 7.
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Both the Arizona and the federal instructions point to
the credentials of the expert witness as an appropriate source
of information for the jurors to use in evaluating the witness's
testimony. The Arizona instruction explicitly tells jurors to
weigh the expert's testimony "considering the witness's
qualifications and experience" along with the reasons given for
the opinion, and the other evidence in the case.29 The federal
criminal jury instructions (which mirror the earlier civil jury
instructions) tell the jurors that the court is permitting the
expert to offer opinions because the court has determined that
the expert witness possesses special knowledge by virtue of
education or experience. The jurors then are told that they can
disregard the expert's opinion and are explicitly invited to do so
if they decide that the expert has insufficient education or
experience."
It is not surprising that education and experience
figure prominently in jury instructions. Judges use them to
decide whether to permit an expert to testify.31 Decision makers
of all kinds rely on such cues in deciding whether or not to
accept advice from a particular source. A prospective patient
would be wise to learn about the educational and professional
background of a surgeon one was thinking of employing to
remove her appendix.
At the same time, we expect the trier of fact to arrive
at a decision that is not the result of mere deference to an
expert.32 The ambiguity in the judgment situation, as in the
instructions, is how much weight should be given to the
credentials of the expert.
The trial itself invites jurors to pay substantial
attention to the education and experience of the expert. Direct
examination typically begins with a recitation of the
accomplishments of the expert witness, and the impressive
resume often follows the jurors into the jury room. In short,
jurors (and judges) are instructed to evaluate all aspects of an
expert witness's testimony, including his or her credentials.
29 id.
See Devitt et al., supra note 27 and accompanying text.
" FED. R. EVID. 702.
32 See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of
Experts: Deference or Education, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1135-37 (1993).
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B. Special Features of the Trial as an Arena for
Persuasion and Decision Making
In considering the jury's response to experts we need
also to consider that the common law jury trial (the "trial"),
with its adversary procedure, has certain special features that
have important consequences for decision making. These
features have been discussed in detail in many writings," but a
summary of the unique features is necessary to put the debate
over juries and experts into context. The trial involves opposing
parties who each, through the presentation of testimony and
other evidence, attempt to persuade the trier that their version
of events about a civil or criminal matter is correct. Thus, the
trial may be viewed as an arena for persuasion, but one with
very serious consequences. A defendant's life or liberty will be
affected by the decision or, in civil cases, the decision will
determine if one party receives compensation for an alleged
injury, sometimes an injury involving a claim for very large
sums of compensatory or punitive damages. From the very
beginning of the trial, the judge's instructions to the jury and
the lawyers' opening statements emphasize the serious
consequences. The gravity of the decision is reinforced
throughout the trial by the procedures and formal atmosphere
of the courtroom. At the end of the trial the closing statements
of the contending parties and the judge's final instructions
remind the jury of the responsibility that is in their hands.
Unlike many other decision makers who can actively
solicit information, jurors are dependent on the opposing
parties to provide the information necessary for their decision.
Jurors are specifically instructed that they are not to do any
investigation themselves and to base their decision solely on
the evidence at trial. They are also provided with legal
instructions about the applicable law and the standards for
their decision, such as the balance of probabilities or proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the information provided
for the decision primarily involves a one-way presentation of
testimony with jurors not allowed to ask questions either for
-See generally MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE RULES ADRIFT (1997);
MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
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clarification or to probe unaddressed issues.34 Furthermore, the
adversary system prescribes a particular order of presentation
with one side presenting all of its evidence on all issues before
the opposing side has an opportunity to present an alternative
interpretation of the dispute.
The trial setting is primarily oral in nature. While
documents or physical evidence often play an important role at
trial, the meaning of this evidence is interpreted orally by
witnesses who have special knowledge of the matters. The
witnesses' testimony frequently involves content that is beyond
the knowledge and experience of laypersons. It may also
involve new ways of looking at knowledge that may strongly
conflict with "common sense" knowledge35 about such matters
as the manner in which police investigations are carried out,
insanity, diminished capacity, sexual abuse, or eyewitness
reliability."
The experts who appear at trial are selected for their
positions and assumed loyalty to the party that calls them. The
adversary system, therefore, may result in one side presenting
experts who offer opinions that only a small minority of
persons in their field would endorse." These experts may have
an ideological commitment to a position or loyalty to the party
that calls them that may cause the experts to present their
opinions in a biased way.3
The adversary system relies on the opposing side to
cross-examine and deconstruct the testimony of the expert to
expose its weakness or irrelevance to the dispute. Then, the
first party is allowed to re-examine its experts to rehabilitate
There are exceptions to these rules, as discussed in Part VI.3 See generally NOIMAN FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JUROR'S NOTIONS
OF THE LAW (1995); see also Jason Schklar & Shari Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA
Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAw & HUti. BEHAV. 159, 180-81 (1999).
3r See discussion of social framework evidence infra Part IV.
3 See JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
LITIGATION 91 (1998); see generally MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
COURT MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES (1988); Simon &
Zusman, The Effect of Contextual Factors on Psychiatrists' Perception of Illness: A Case
Study, 24 J. HEALTH & BEHAV. 186 (1983).
U MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., supra note 34; Naomi Wolf, Social Science and
the Courts: the Detroit Schools Case, 42 THE PUB. INT. 102, 104 (1976); see generally
Gross, Expert Evidence, supra note 21.
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AiERICA ch. 3 (1995).
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them. When the opposing party begins its evidence
presentation, it may call its own experts in an effort to refute
the other party's experts. The end result of the adversary
process is often conflicting testimony from experts-the "battle
of experts"--that requires the jury to decide which experts to
believe.
While some special features of the trial present
potentially confusing information for the jury, other features
offer potentially off-setting assistance. Because the trial is
adversarial in nature, the jury will typically become aware that
there are at least two alternative interpretations of the
evidence. The process of cross-examination may not only
expose weaknesses in an expert's position-the give and take of
examination and cross-examination may result in substantial
repetition of points that educate the jurors about the essential
issues, even if the subject matter was originally unfamiliar to
them. Finally, because the jurors must reach a unanimous
decision, or at least a super-majority decision, through the
process of deliberation, conditions are created for pooling of
insight, knowledge, and perspective on the experts, providing
for a group decision that may be more accurate than the
average decision of individual jurors or a simple combination of
their verdict choices.
The above summary of the trial process may be
familiar, but the effect of these elements is usually overlooked
or ignored in charges and counter-charges about the
competence of juries to understand expert evidence. Of course,
the ultimate effect of these opposing elements on the
performance of the jury is an empirical question, but the
answer may not be a simple one. As the evidence in this Article
will show, under some conditions juries competently deal with
expert evidence, and under other conditions their performance
is less than optimal.
C. The Relevance of Psychological Research for Juror
Understanding, Persuasion, and Decision Making
At core, the legal expectations for jurors involve a
number of psychological assumptions. Jurors must be
motivated to utilize the expert evidence. They must be capable
1134 [Vol. 66: 4
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of understanding the substance of the evidence. They should
draw upon their own life experiences both in evaluating the
reasonableness of the expert's opinion and in assessing its
internal consistency. In evaluating the evidence they should
give attention to characteristics of the expert that bear on the
expert's credentials, reliability, and truthfulness, but they
should not give undue weight to the credentials. They must
consider using the evidence in their decision making only if it
is judged by them to be reliable, and they must not
automatically defer to the expert's opinion, but must instead
judge it for reasonableness, and place that opinion in the
context of other evidence. It is further assumed that all of these
factors will be a result of jury deliberation, not simple
mathematical pooling of individual opinions.
Ultimately, we must assess jury behavior with respect
to these issues in the specific setting in which jurors operate.
Nevertheless, there are bodies of general psychological
research that inform us about the potential abilities of jurors to
understand and process expert evidence. A brief review of this
research will prove useful in interpreting specific research on
juries.
First is a body of research that assesses laypersons'
abilities to understand statistical and methodological
reasoning. Statistical and methodological reasoning are at the
heart of much scientific and medical testimony and many other
forms of expert evidence. If, for example, a layperson is
incapable of understanding problems such as statistical
representativeness, confounded variables, and conditional
probabilities, then he or she will not be able to grasp the
reasoning behind an expert opinion, even if it is clearly
explained and examined during direct and cross-examination
of the expert witness.
Research into these reasoning skills has shown that in
reacting to everyday life problems, people correctly use
inferential reasoning skills, but that they have difficulty
applying them to new domains that are unfamiliar to them."
40 See generally RULES FOR REASONING (Richard E. Nisbett ed., 1993);
Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching Reasoning, 238 SCI. 625 (1987); see also Darrin R.
Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and
Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 Am. PSYCHOL. 431, 432 (1988).
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Thus, the work of social psychologist Harold Kelley has shown
that in making attributions about interpersonal behaviors,
ordinary people understand and use, on a daily basis, concepts
of necessariness and sufficiency in assessing causality. Kelley
has also shown that ordinary people possess different cognitive
schemas for checking forms of evidence bearing on causality.'
Other research has shown that when presented with a concrete
task such as one involving sales receipts, laypersons correctly
use rules of conditional probability, but when faced with an
abstract problem of conditional probability that has the same
formal logical structure as the sales receipt problem, their
performance is very poor. In short, there is no transfer;
reasoning appears to be what psychologists call "domain
specific."
Yet there is also evidence that the reasoning skills
that facilitate performance across situations can be taught.
One study compared the statistical reasoning skills of students
entering post-graduate training in the fields of psychology,
medicine, chemistry, and law with their statistical reasoning
skills two years later.42 The authors' hypothesis was that
because the fields of psychology and medicine are primarily
probabilistic disciplines, while chemistry and law are not, the
exposure to two years of graduate training would improve the
ability of psychology and medical students to solve statistical
problems, but this improvement would not occur to the same
degree in the other two disciplines.43 Psychology and medical
students showed large improvements in their ability to solve
problems in statistical and methodological reasoning.44
Psychology, medical, and law training increased students'
reasoning about conditional logic.4" Chemistry training had no
effect on any of the types of reasoning that were studied.46
Most important for the purposes of this Article,
research by Richard Nisbett and colleagues has found that
even relatively brief training sessions can improve the ability
4' Harold Kelly, The Process of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOL. 107
(1973).
42 See Lehman et al., supra note 40, at 434.
43 See Lehman et al., supra note 40, at 434.
44 See Lehman et al., supra note 40, at 437.
45 See Lehman et al., supra note 40, at 438.
46 See Lehman et al., supra note 40, at 440.
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of laypeople to reason about common life problems." Indeed,
even the logical reasoning of seventh grade children can be
improved by simple training sessions.48 Among other findings
in this body of research literature, Patricia Cheng and Keith
Holyoak found that providing an explicit purpose for a rule
that would otherwise seem arbitrary can improve reasoning
performance.49 They also found that brief instruction using
semantically meaningful examples improved performance more
than intensive training sessions devoted to abstract conditional
rules." In summarizing an extensive body of research
literature Nisbett and his colleagues concluded:
[P]eople do make use of inferential rules and these rules can be
readily taught. In fact, rules that are extensions of naturally induced
ones can be taught by quite abstract means.... [The types of rules
that people use naturally and can be taught most easily are a family
of pragmatic inferential rule systems that people induce in the
context of solving recurrent everyday problems."
The empirical question posed by this research is
whether, or perhaps when, the trial process provides jurors
with the cognitive tools to assess expert evidence in terms of
their life experience.
A second body of research indicates that people use
cognitive devices called social schemas to organize information
about the world around them. 2 Nancy Pennington and Reid
Hastie have used these insights about social schemas to
develop a theory of jury decision making that they call the
"Story Model."53 In short, the Story Model asserts that jurors do
not approach the trial with a blank slate. 4 Rather, they utilize
47 See Nisbett et al., supra note 40.
4" Richard Herrnstein et al., Teaching Thinking Skills, 41 AM. PSYCHOL. 1279
(1986).
"0 Patricia Cheng & Keith Holyoak, Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas, 17
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 391 (1985).
0 Patricia Cheng et al., Pragmatic Versus Syntactic Approaches to Deductive
Reasoning, 18 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL 293 (1986).
"' Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching Reasoning, in RULES FOR REASONING
297-98 (Richard Nisbett ed., 1993).
12 Eliot Smith, Mental Representation and Memory, in THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY vol. 1, at 391 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 519, 520 (1991).
'4Id. at 523.
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their past experience to filter and understand the various
pieces of evidence as the evidence is presented and to develop
alternative interpretations, or "stories," about the events that
led to the dispute now on trial." These alternative stories are
then weighed against one another to determine which one is
most consistent and logical. The preferred story is then
considered under the instructions about the law provided by
the trial judge." The Story Model is widely accepted as a
general description of how jurors process information and
reach their decisions. It has many implications that bear on
juror decision making, but for our present purposes, the
important point is that the various parts of trial evidence
including the testimony of experts are not viewed in isolation
instead they are integrated into "stories" derived from pre-
existing cognitive frameworks and from the other trial
evidence, including the testimony of plaintiffs, defendants, and
other witnesses.
A third body of research has investigated the processes
underlying attitude change and decision making in settings
involving persuasion attempts. This research indicates that
two basic types of cognitive processes are used to integrate
information, central processing and peripheral processing."
When people engage in central or systematic processing, they
carefully scrutinize the message and examine the quality of the
arguments that are being made. 9 When they engage in
peripheral or heuristic processing of persuasive messages, they
take mental short cuts. Rather than attending to the quality of
arguments, they may, for example, make their decision based
Id. at 523-24.
G Id. at 530-31.
W See generally Alice Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and
Function, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 269 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds.,
1998); Richard Petty & Duane Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for
Persuasion Variables, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 323 (Daniel Gilbert et
al. eds., 1998); Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing
and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 752 (1980); Shelly Chaiken & Duriaraj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing
Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity,
and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460
(1994). 58 Chaiken and her colleagues prefer to refer to systematic versus heuristic
processing, in contrast to central versus peripheral processing.
59 See generally sources cited supra note 57.
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upon the length of the message, the relative number of
arguments for one side or another, or the prestige or purported
expertise of the source. The claim that juries defer to the
credentials of the expert, rather than scrutinizing the quality
of the testimony, is, in psychological terms, a claim that jurors
engage in peripheral rather than central processing. Research
on persuasion indicates that central processing takes place
when people are strongly motivated to understand the message
and have the intellectual ability to grasp the arguments. When
they are unmotivated or unable to process the message, they
take cognitive shortcuts and rely on peripheral cues. Thus, this
body of research would suggest that if two experts provide
testimony of equal quality, but one expert is perceived to be of
higher prestige than the other, the higher prestige person
would tend to prevail in persuasiveness. Similarly, this
research would suggest that the more difficult the testimony,
the greater the likelihood that jurors would revert to
peripheral cues.
These findings from psychological research must be
qualified by the fact that they have been derived in settings
quite different from the settings in which juries make their
decisions. The trial setting places great emphasis on the
importance of the verdict for people's lives. Unlike the
persuasion settings-in which most of this research has been
carried out-the adversarial system includes opening
arguments by both sides, prescribed orders of presentation,
cross-examination, judicial admonitions, the presence of other
evidence bearing on the verdict, and the opportunity to
deliberate. Thus, it presents a very different persuasion setting
and raises questions about the extent to which we can
generalize to the legal context. Additionally, as noted above,
judicial instructions specifically inform jurors that peripheral
cues such as credentials are to be considered along with the
central cues bearing on the content of the testimony.
Nevertheless, this body of psychological theory and research on
individual decision makers provides a framework that is
helpful in analyzing jury responses to expert testimony.
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III. WHAT JURORS TELL Us ABOUT THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF
EXPERTS AND THEIR DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
Neil Vidmar conducted interviews with jurors who had
just finished serving on juries that had decided medical
malpractice cases." The cases involved surgery for urinary
incontinence, a brain damaged baby, a woman who died from a
ruptured bowel, a woman who became blind and alleged a
failure to make a timely diagnosis and a death involving an
allergic reaction to a contrast dye. All involved expert
testimony about causation and all involved battles of experts.
In three out of the five cases the verdicts favored the
defendants.
At least some of the jurors in each of the first four
cases had a basic grasp of the main medical issues and
recognized the basic points of disagreement between the
opposing experts.6' In the rectal incontinence case, for example,
there was a basic disagreement between experts about "urge"
versus "stress" incontinence and how cystometrograms should
be read.62 Another issue involved nerve blockage and surgery
involving a sacral rhizotomy. The experts on both sides
supplemented their oral testimony with numerous charts and
graphs.63 The views of leading jurors coincided with notes taken
during the trial by Vidmar and several law students. These
jurors ascribed their understanding of the issues to clear and
repetitive tutoring by the trial witnesses." The brain damaged
baby case involved a number of claims, but the central claim
was misdating the due date for delivery and actions not taken
as a result of that misdating.6 It was known that the baby was
in a footling-breech position and in danger of hypoxia due to
strangulation of the umbilical cord during delivery." The
defense presented two obstetricians, a neonatologist and three
'0 NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY ch. 12(1995). 1 1 Id. at 142-43, 150-51.
12 Id. at 129-30.
G Id.
'4 Id. at 131.
65 VIDMAR, supra note 60, at 134.
rG Id. at 133-34.
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other physicians who testified about the standard of care.67 The
plaintiff then called a pediatric neurologist as a rebuttal
witness." In post-trial interviews, many of the jurors
demonstrated a good understanding of the trial issues, such as
diagnosis of delivery by gauging fundal height and by cervical
dilation.
The ruptured bowel case involved many doctors and
nurses. Although the jurors considered the testimony of the
plaintiff witnesses, they characterized the main witnesses as
"hired guns." 9 The blindness case also involved complicated
and conflicting medical testimony. The jurors subsequently
admitted that the testimony was challenging to them and that
the lawyers had not done a good job in presenting matters
clearly for them.7' Nevertheless, in comparison to the plaintiffs'
experts who were viewed as presenting straightforward
answers, the jurors were skeptical about the truthfulness of
some of the defense experts' testimony, and believed that their
very particular and technical answers were evasive.71 The
jurors were also aware that one defense witness was originally
scheduled to be called as a plaintiff witness but reversed
himself, and that other defense witnesses were colleagues of
the defendants. 72 Nevertheless, in this case the jurors found
one defendant not liable, while assessing liability against
another defendant.73 The CT Scan case was very complicated,
with procedural issues and conflicting expert testimony from
qualified experts on both sides. The critical issues in the case
were not whether a reaction to contrast dyes killed the patient
but rather who did what when and who was responsible. 74 For
legal reasons the plaintiffs pleadings in the case were
unorthodox.
None of the five malpractice cases allows an
unequivocal answer as to whether the jury reached the
"correct" result, but each does show that the jurors were not
, Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
c Id. at 141.
70 VIDMAR, supra note 60, at 150.
71 Id.
7 Id. at 145.
73 Id. at 142.
' Id. at 152-53.
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passive in evaluating the experts or their testimony. Indeed,
one of the findings from the interviews of jurors was that they
clearly understood the adversary system.7" They identified
basic disagreements between the experts. They considered
absence of evidence and incompleteness of testimony. They
scrutinized possible motives behind each expert's testimony
such as money and the possibility that an expert was giving
testimony to support a fellow physician. They had a basically
solid understanding of burdens of proof and where the expert
testimony fit into assessing that burden. Most importantly, the
jurors in each case evaluated the testimony in the context of
other trial evidence. In each of the five cases, the expert
testimony was only one part of the evidence. There were
critical issues of when and what human actions had been
taken. In the urinary incontinence case, a central question was
whether the plaintiff had been informed of the risks of the
surgery,76 and in the injured baby case, the issue involved
actions not taken by the pediatrician.77 The ruptured bowel
case and the blindness case involved the timing of actions by
medical personnel.78  The CT Scan death case involved
questions of the timing of medical personnel actions and
hospital rules about supervision of technical assistants.78
75 VIDMAR, supra note 60, at 171-72.
" Id. at 128.
nId. at 134.
78 Id. at 138, 146-47.
71 See Steve Cohen, Malpractice: Behind a $26-Million Award to a Boy
Injured in Surgery, NEW YORK, Oct. 1, 1990, at 41, reprinted in VIDMAR, supra note 60,
at 95. Melis v. Kutin was another medical malpractice case. It involved a brain-injured
boy that resulted in a $26 million plaintiff verdict. This report also showed a jury that
was not passive in evaluating the testimony of the experts. Like many other
malpractice cases, issues of expert testimony were interwoven with issues of when
certain actions were taken and who took them, subject matter regarding accuracy and
truthfulness that have long been considered strengths of the jury system. The trial
judge reviewed the evidence and supported the jury's verdict on all but one of the
liability issues. See Id. at chs. 9-10. Each element of the damage award, also a subject
of expert testimony, was also reviewed and parts of the award were set aside or
reduced as not consistent with the evidence. Melis v. Kutin, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1990, at
21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 1990).
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In another study, Sanja Ivkovich and Valerie Hans8
conducted tape-recorded interviews with fifty-five jurors who
served in civil trials that included medical malpractice,
workplace injury, product liability, asbestos, and a motor
vehicle accident."1 The number of experts averaged more than
four for each case and the majority were physicians.82 Rather
than uncritically accepting expert opinion, most jurors
appeared aware that the experts were called as part of the
adversarial process and from the outset of the trial expressed
reservations about them.' The interviews led Ivkovich and
Hans to conclude that jurors tended to evaluate experts on the
basis of credentials, motives, general impressions, and the
content and presentation of their testimony.". However, the
importance accorded these factors varied from juror to juror,
expert to expert, and case to case. The jurors offered their
views on what constituted good and bad witnesses. Good
witnesses were described as good teachers with sound
credentials and acceptable motives for offering their
testimony.8 The jurors' judgments of what made a bad witness
garnered less agreement among the jurors who were
interviewed. Ivkovich and Hans found that jurors did not
ignore or uncritically accept the testimony of experts and
further concluded:
[W]hen jurors are faced with the difficult task of evaluating evidence
that is outside their common knowledge, they rely on sensible
techniques: assessing the completeness and consistency of the
testimony and evaluating it against their knowledge of related
factors. For especially complex topics, the jury relies on its members
who possess greater familiarity with the subject matter of the expert
testimony."
"' Sanja Ivkovich & Valerie Hans, Jurors and Experts, 16 ADVOCATE: THE
MAGAZINE FOR DELAWARE TRIAL LAWYERS 17, 20 (1994) [hereinafter Ivkovich & Hans,
Jurors and Experts]; Sanja Ivkovich & Valerie Hans, Jurors' Evaluation of Expert
Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message (2000) (unpublished paper on file
with author).
8, Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 80, at 18-19.
82 Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 80, at 19.
Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 80, at 55.
Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 80, at 18.
Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 80, at 56.
Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 80, at 20.
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In a series of studies, Daniel Shuman and his
colleagues surveyed jurors in Dallas, Baltimore, Seattle, and
Tucson regarding how jurors assessed experts." Based on the
survey responses, Shuman and his colleagues found that
rather than relying on superficial characteristics such as
appearance or personality,88 or merely deferring to the expert's
conclusions, jurors tried to evaluate experts on the basis of
their professionalism, their impartiality, and the logic of the
testimony.89 In a summary statement of their findings, Shuman
and colleagues concluded as follows:
We did not find evidence of a "white coat syndrome" in which
jurors mechanistically deferred to certain experts because of their
field of expertise. Instead we found jurors far more skeptical and
demanding in their assessments.
Jurors made expert-specific decisions based on a sensible set of
considerations-the expert's qualifications, reasoning, factual
familiarity and impartiality. Our data do not lend support to the
critics who paint jurors as gullible, naive or thoughtless persons who
resort to irrational decision-making strategies that rely on
superficial considerations."
Systematic research on the responses of jurors to
expert evidence in criminal juries has been lacking. However, a
recent and very important study of criminal juries in New
Zealand undertaken for the New Zealand Law Reform
Commission provides data that appear generally consistent
with that derived from American civil juries. The study
involved extensive interviews with jurors from forty-eight New
Zealand criminal trials that took place in 1998, eighteen in the
"7 See generally Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical Examination of the
Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURimmTRics J. 375 (1991); Daniel
Shuman et al., Assessing the Believability of Expert Witnesses: Science in the Jury Box,
37 JURIMETRICS J. 23 (1996); Daniel Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the
Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts-Part Two: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS
J. 193 (1994).
"' A simulation study by R.L. Tanton, Jury Preconceptions and Their Effect on
Expert Scientific Testimony, 24 J. FORENSIC SCI. 681-91 (1979), concluded that factors
such as whether the expert was or was not wearing glasses, clothing style and hair
style affected a sample of subjects' views of who was a "more knowledgeable" expert.
This study has severe methodological limitations that need not be analyzed here.89 See Shuman et al., supra note 87.90 Daniel Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing the People from the
Legal Process: the Rhetoric and Research on Judical Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POLY & L. 242, 242-58 (1997).
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High Court, and thirty in district courts.9' The trial durations
ranged from one half day to eighteen days; twenty-one of the
trials lasted more than three days. The offenses charged
included murder, rape, robbery, wounding, drugs, kidnapping,
burglary, and fraud. There were nine fraud trials in the
sample, chosen specifically because they were deemed to be
complex trials. Expert evidence in some form was introduced in
nineteen of the forty-eight trials in the study. The testimony
involved such matters as fingerprint identification, drug
dealing practices, psychiatric and psychological states of mind,
accounting practices, and metallurgy.
In thirteen of the trials the jurors stated that they had
no difficulty with the technical nature of the evidence. In many
of the nineteen cases, however, the jurors complained that the
evidence was not adequately explained and contained excessive
jargon and undue technical detail. In five of the six trials
where the evidence presented problems for some of the jurors,
the New Zealand researchers could not decide whether the
problem should be ascribed to the defects in the nature and
presentation of the evidence or the jurors' inability to absorb
and comprehend it. They did note that in most instances the
comprehension problem was reported by, at most, three of the
twelve jurors, and in some of these instances initial confusion
was clarified by a subsequent expert or clarified by the other
jurors during deliberations.
In one of the nineteen cases, the expert's
qualifications may have unduly impressed at least some of the
jurors and caused them to accept his evidence uncritically. One
of the jurors commented: "When the defence read out his
qualifications, you accept that he's very experienced and that
he should have a reasonable grasp of what he's talking about."
Another juror said that the witness was such a professional
person that she believed his testimony because "[iut gave me
the impression he was a quite highly educated man and he
knew what he was talking about."9
1 "WARREN YOUNG ET AL., JURIES SURVEY-REPORT OF FINDINGS (New
Zealand Law Commission 1999).
" Id. at 98.
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Nevertheless, in most of the cases the jurors paid close
attention to the content of the evidence, even while sometimes
criticizing the expert as arrogant or "self-inflated."
Additionally, the jurors used the evidence when they deemed it
helpful. In one case, for example, the testimony of a
psychologist helped the jury make up their minds. In another
case, testimony about correspondence between fibers found on
the victim's clothing and fibers of a jersey owned by the
accused convinced the jurors of a conclusive link between the
victim and the accused. In other cases, however, the jury
concluded that the expert testimony lacked credibility and they
rejected it.
In contrast to the conclusions in the above research
studies, some case studies involving complex cases have
yielded less positive conclusions. Molly Selvin and Larry
Picus93 interviewed jurors who had decided an asbestos case
involving four plaintiffs.94 The jurors awarded a total of $3.9
million to the four plaintiffs and levied $4 million in punitive
damages against the defendant Johns-Manville." To prove
their claim of liability, the plaintiffs had to prove that the
defendants had marketed their products without an adequate
warning and also prove that each had developed asbestosis."
The plaintiffs presented two doctors who affirmed asbestosis,
and the defense tendered two doctors who concluded that the
plaintiffs did not have the disease.97
Selvin and Picus concluded that the jurors, ignoring or
not understanding epidemiological evidence, did not
understand that not everyone exposed to asbestos will develop
a disease and believed that every one of the plaintiffs would
become as sick as the sickest plaintiff.98 As Richard Lempert
has pointed out, their beliefs were not irrational responses, but
rather reasonable inferences by the jurors that the attorneys
and their experts failed to address in presenting the case.99
93 MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PiCus, THE RAND CORPORATION, INSTITUTE FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE (1987).
"Newman v. Johns-Mansville, No. M-79-124-CAU (E.D. Tex. 1984).
SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 93, at 22.
Id. at 14, 19.
'" Id. at 14-16.
"Id. at 24.
Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY 181 (Robert Litan ed., 1993).
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Selvin and Picus concluded that the jurors "seemed to have
formed opinions as to the merits of a witness's testimony or an
attorney's argument based not only on the substance of the
testimony or evidence presented but also on their perception of
that individual's characteristics, personality and behavior."'
For instance, they asserted that the jurors "were generally
skeptical if not negatively disposed toward many of the medical
experts ... [," and "tended to evaluate the credibility of these
witnesses in large part on their personal characteristics rather
than on the information they presented.""1
A study by an American Bar Association committee of
four complex cases included one case relating to trade
secrets. 2 Even though two members of the jury were engineers
and helped the other jurors understand the evidence, one of the
engineer jurors reported that he and the other engineer felt
inundated with the technical information."3 The other jurors
were even more confused.
Joseph Sanders interviewed four jurors who decided
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner,"' a Bendectin case
that involved four kinds of scientific data bearing on causation
of birth defects."' Sanders' interviews focused on jurors' beliefs
about the relative importance of types of evidence and the
jurors' evaluation of the experts who presented that evidence.
He also asked the jurors to estimate the weight of scientific
opinion as to whether the drug Bendectin could have caused
fetal malformations. Sanders concluded that the jurors had
somewhat contradictory views of the experts."0 On the one
hand, they had a difficult time distinguishing between experts
and thus tended to discount all testimony as a product of "hired
guns."0 7 On the other hand, they did have views about the
"3 SELVIN & Picus, supra note 93, at ix.
1 Id. at 27.
""SPECIAL COAMITEE ON JURY COMPREHENSION OF THE AIERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION ON LITIGATION (Special Committee 1998).
'03 This case raises the interesting question of whether a judge could
understand the case, unless that judge had more training in engineering than the two
jurors with B.S. degrees in engineering.
104 907 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. App. 1994), rev'd, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
'0' Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45, 52-53 (1993).
10r Id.
107 Id.
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relative effectiveness of the experts. Additionally, the jurors
over-estimated the percentage of scientists who believed that
Bendectin was a teratogen" They made no distinction
between proof of general causation (did Bendectin cause any
birth defects?) and proof of specific causation (was the
relationship between exposure and injury sufficiently strong
that it was possible to conclude that Bendectin caused plaintiff
Havner's defect?). Considering Havner and other Bendectin
cases, Sanders' general conclusion was that "in cases involving
complex scientific evidence juries have a difficult time reaching
the truth."'0 9
These jury interview studies, including those by Selvin
and Picus and Sanders, do reach some common conclusions.
The studies indicate that, at least from juror reports, there is
little evidence that juries take their task lightly. All of the
reports strongly suggested that jurors were motivated to take
the task seriously. They understood the nature of the
adversary system and the consequent bias in testimony that
can come from the motivations of experts. Most of the studies
indicated that the juries attempted to evaluate the testimony
on its merits. The Selvin and Picus study suggested that jurors
placed improper emphasis on characteristics of witnesses, but
Selvin and Picus were the only researchers to draw this
conclusion.
The difficulty with post-trial interviews is that
questions can be raised about the accuracy of jurors' reports.
The interviews also do not indicate whether the reports of jury
confusion were projections of their own confusion onto the
other jury members. Similar observations can be made with
respect to the extent to which the reports over- or under-
estimate the influence of expert qualifications, rather than the
processing of the content of the experts' testimony. Moreover,
unless an independent source is available that can provide a
baseline for what a rational response to the evidence would
have been, it is difficult to evaluate how well or how poorly the
108 Id.
1o' SANDERS, supra note 37, at 193.
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jurors handled the evidence that was presented at trial.
Experimental research can assist in understanding the
psychology of how jurors process information as opposed to how
they report that they have processed it.
IV. FINDINGS FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH STUDIES
A. Statistical Information and Peripheral Versus Central
Processing
The Bendectin and asbestos trials in the civil justice
system and criminal trials involving DNA fingerprints have
received the most publicity in judicial and scholarly writings,
but they are a reminder that important and frequent expert
testimony involves probability theories. Thus, blood typing,
hair fiber, material fiber or paint matches, and gun bullet
ballistics, to take common examples, all involve at least an
implicit estimate of the likelihood that entity A is or is not
associated with entity B. Conclusions in the field of
epidemiology, which attempts to study causation of diseases
like asbestosis, cancer, or birth defects, is heavily dependent
upon statistical associations between exposures to certain
environmental or chemical agents and the development of
human diseases. The probabilities involve calculations testing
whether the associations can be explained by random error or
by some other causal factor. Complex expert testimony of this
type raises two important and interrelated psychological
questions. Can jurors comprehend testimony involving
statistical inferences when faced with such testimony? Are
they prone to rely on peripheral rather than central processing
of the testimony?
A relatively small but important body of research has
shown that mock jurors are not very competent in utilizing
probability estimates when they are presented in the form of
abstract evidence bearing on guilt or liability."' The jurors
110 David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process:
Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 1, 15-
16 (1988); Jane Goodman, Jurors' Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic
Evidence, 16 A. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361 (1992); Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of
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either gave the evidence more weight than it deserved or not
enough weight.' Gary Wells conducted a series of experiments
that presented college students with different forms of
information bearing on the likelihood that a bus belonging to a
particular company was responsible for killing a dog.' The
participants in the experiments were able to draw appropriate
probability inferences, but they did not exhibit very good
reasoning skills in translating those probabilities into verdicts.
Wells concluded that rather than reasoning from the evidence
to consider whether the dog was killed by a bus belonging to
the particular bus company, many persons focused on the
possibility of reaching an incorrect decision in holding the bus
company liable and how they could justify their decision if it
turned out to be wrong. Wells gave the same tasks to a sample
of judges and found that they performed no better than the
other participants in his experiments. We will return to this
latter finding in Section V.
DNA evidence is generally presented to jurors with
probability information specifying the likelihood that an
obtained match is due to chance. Jonathan Koehler and his
colleagues". showed that mock jurors were likely to give less
than optimal weight to the possibility of a laboratory error
when it was accompanied by a low random match probability.
1 14
In a follow-up experiment, Jason Schklar and Shari Seidman
Diamond"' found that the mock jurors in the study
inappropriately gave less weight to the evidence than was
warranted. This was partly because the jurors did not
understand how to combine probabilities of error in the match
and errors in the laboratory, and partly because prior beliefs
about the possible corruption of the original samples as they
passed through police and prosecutor's hands may have
Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49, 79 (1996); William C. Thompson,
Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9
(1989). I See generally sources cited supra note 110.
12 Gary Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective
Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992).
113 Jonathan Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence:
Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 37 JuRIMETRICS J. 425 (1995).
114 Id.
"s Jason Schklar, & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA
Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 178, 180 (1999).
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influenced their decisions even though this possibility was not
raised during the experiment."6 Some of the jurors raised
alternative explanations for the match, such as if an identical
twin had perpetrated the rape or that sex had been
consensual."'
Schklar and Diamond strongly cautioned that their
experiment was only an exploratory study using college
students who did not deliberate and that the experiment (like
Koehler's) lacked the rich context of a real trial, including
cross-examination."' Nevertheless, the experiment raised two
issues relevant to understanding juror responses to experts. It
is consistent with the other studies indicating juror difficulties
in properly utilizing probability estimates. In addition, it
demonstrates the extent to which prior expectations and social
schemas held by jurors may influence the interpretation and
weight that jurors give to expert evidence. One possible
explanation of the jurors' focus on the possible contamination
in the chain of evidence handling is that the widely publicized
trial of O.J. Simpson, with its charges of contaminated blood
samples and the defense theory about an alternative killer,
stimulated jurors to consider such alternative explanations.
Lynne ForsterLee and her colleagues conducted an
experiment in which jury-eligible adults viewed a videotaped
trial simulation that lasted slightly over two and a half
hours." The trial involved a claim that a company caused
health problems for the plaintiffs by dumping a dangerous
chemical in their drinking water.1 20 However, the four plaintiffs
differed in the degree of their illness, presenting the jurors
with an important task of distinguishing between plaintiffs in
setting compensatory damage awards."' Prior research by
these authors had found that the technicality of the language
used by experts had an important influence on whether jurors
were able to differentiate between more or less deserving
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
"o' Lynne ForsterLee et al., The Bottom Line: The Effect of Written Expert
Witness Statements on Juror Verdicts and Information Processing, 24 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 259, 261-62 (2000).
12" Id. at 263.
121 Id. at 263-64.
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plaintiffs in the compensation stage of a trial: the more
technical, the less jurors were likely to differentiate. "
An immunologist and a psychologist were key witnesses
for the plaintiff and were subject to cross-examination in the
trial simulation.'23 Some of the jurors were given written
summaries of the expert witnesses' testimony before they saw
that witness testify while others were given summaries only
after the testimony.124 A control group of jurors received no
summaries of the experts' testimony.'2 Compared to jurors in
the control condition, jurors who received written summaries
were more likely to make clear distinctions between the
differentially worthy plaintiffs and recall more trial-relevant
information. 2r The effects were more pronounced in the jurors
who received the summaries of expert testimony in advance of
the expert testimony.2 2 ForsterLee and her colleagues
concluded that the written summaries assisted jurors in
developing cognitive schemas that were then used in
interpreting the complex expert testimony.1 28 In short, the
written summaries assisted the jurors in understanding the
evidence. Although the summaries did contain information
bearing on the witnesses' current positions and credentials, the
greater recall of technical information and differentiation of
verdicts suggests that the jurors engaged in central rather
than peripheral processing of the testimony.
An earlier study by Irwin Horowitz and Kenneth
Bordens used a similar version of the trial simulation
conducted by ForsterLee and her colleagues.1 29 The main
purpose of the research did not focus on experts per se, but
nevertheless expert testimony about causation was central in
the trial.3 Horowitz and Bordens concluded from their
analyses that "[j]uries ... used the totality of the evidence to
122 Irwin Horowitz et al., Effects of Trial Complexity on Decision Making, 81 J.
APp. PSYCHOL. 757, 757-68 (1996).
'2 ForsterLee et al., supra note 119, at 263.
124 Id. at 264.
I2 d.
Id. at 266-67.
127 Id.
128 ForsterLee et al, supra note 119, at 268-69.
129 Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 273 (1990).
170 Id. at 274.
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decide all issues, especially general causation, which contained
the most ambiguous testimony." 3' This conclusion also seems
consistent with jurors using central processing to evaluate trial
evidence.
Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper explored the
impact of complexity in a richly detailed simulation experiment
that also sheds light on how jurors process difficult
testimony.132 Jurors, who participated in the research during
their jury service, watched a videotaped antitrust trial,
including opening statements, direct and cross-examination,
closing arguments, and instructions. 133 During the trial, they
heard damage estimates from opposing experts."' One expert
presented an estimate of damages based on the performance of
a similar company that was not affected by the alleged price-
fixing agreement, a so-called yardstick model.135 The opposing
expert presented a regression model that used past
performance to project what costs would have been in the
absence of the price-fixing agreement."3 Half of the jurors
heard the yardstick expert testify for the plaintiff and the
statistical expert testify for the defense. 137 The other half heard
the statistical expert testify for the plaintiff and the yardstick
expert for the defense. The jurors showed generally good
comprehension of the testimony by both experts, but the
abstract statistical testimony was somewhat more difficult for
them than the more concrete yardstick evidence.
38
Neither expert overwhelmed the jurors."9 Although
the statistical expert was perceived as more expert than the
yardstick expert, the yardstick expert was viewed as clearer.40
Perceived clarity and expertise were both significant predictors
of persuasiveness, so that the two attributes appeared to cancel
131 Id. at 269.
132 Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to
Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOCY REv. 513
(1992).
13 Id.
"3 Id.
135 Id.
13C Id.
137 Diamond & Casper, supra note 132.
13 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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one another out. As a consequence, the two experts did not
differ in their influence on the jurors' verdict preferences.14 1
A series of studies by Joel Cooper and his colleagues
appears at first blush to be inconsistent with the Horowitz,142
Forsterlee, 3 and Diamond and Casper findings. Cooper and
his colleagues 14 4 created a one hour videotaped trial with two
witnesses, the plaintiffs expert and the defendant's expert.14" '
They varied the educational credentials and complexity of the
technical language used by the plaintiffs expert who was
testifying that PCBs were the cause of the plaintiffs cancer in
a toxic tort case.46 When the highly credentialed plaintiffs
expert used linguistically complex language, he was more
influential than when he either used simple language or had
only moderate credentials or both. 47
Cooper and his colleagues use peripheral processing to
explain the persuasiveness of the witness who had impressive
credentials and used complex language. According to the study,
jurors turned to the peripheral cue of credentials when they
were faced with the complex language of the plaintiffs expert
in order to enable them to easily determine whether to accept
his testimony.14 Although it is clear that the respondents who
had to evaluate the complex evidence did appear to make use
of credentials in their evaluation, it is not clear whether a shift
from central to peripheral processing explains the result. On
Cooper and colleagues' test of juror comprehension of the
testimony, jurors in all four experimental conditions indicated
good comprehension, and the scores did not differ across
conditions 4  Thus, while it is possible that the test was
relatively easy, these results do indicate that the jurors
generally understood the gist of the testimony even when it
was presented in complex language. The strong and consistent
performance on comprehension is important because it
141 Id. at 542-44.
142 Horowitz et al., supra note 122.
143 ForsterLee et al., supra note 119.
144 Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make
Decisions?, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 379 (1996).
14' Diamond & Casper, supra note 132.
14G Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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suggests that the jurors: (1) centrally processed the expert's
testimony, and (2) did not avoid cognitive work by relying
simply on the more impressive educational and professional
background of the highly credentialed expert.
In a follow-up set of three studies, Cooper and Isaac
Neuhaus pursued other potential indicators of peripheral
processing by jurors faced with complex expert testimony."'
Using the same case, this time in the form of a short audiotape
of the testimony, these authors investigated the impact of a
substantial rate of pay on the persuasiveness of the expert.5
The first study showed that a highly credentialed expert who
was paid a substantial rate ($4800 per day) had less influence
on jurors than either a less credentialed expert or one with a
substantially lower rate of pay ($75 per day) or both.152 The
combination of strong credentials and a substantial expert fee
apparently signaled to jurors that the expert's motives might
not be entirely pure. 53 Post-experimental interviews suggested
that jurors were more likely to believe that the highly paid and
credentialed expert was employed frequently in that capacity,
and thus was a professional witness or "hired gun."1 54 Ratings
of the honesty of the "hired gan" witness were dramatically
below those for the expert in the other conditions. 5'
A second experiment varied the rate of pay and the
witness experience independently. Again, the highly paid
witness was less persuasive, but only when the witness also
had a substantial history of testifying."6 Cooper and Neuhaus'
interpretation of these two studies, in which the witness spoke
using technical language, is that the complex speech made the
jurors more susceptible to peripheral processing as a way to
"0 Joel Cooper & Isaac Neuhaus, The "Hired Gun" Effect: Assessing the Effect
of Pay, Frequency of Testifying and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony,
24 LAv & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (2000).
151 Id.
1G2 Id.
15 Id.
IA Id.
'5 Cooper & Neuhaus, supra note 150.M" Id.
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avoid the cognitive work that a central processing strategy
would require.15 ' Unfortunately, no comprehension measures
were taken that might have supported the claim that the
jurors were not engaging in central processing.
Finally, in a third study, Cooper and Neuhaus varied
the expert's rate of pay in a more modest range: $750 per hour,
$350 per hour, and $100 per hour (with the opposing expert
always at $350 per hour) and also varied the complexity of the
expert's language, with all plaintiffs experts both experienced
(fourteenth time testifying) and with high credentials.' Again,
the expert who used highly complex language and was paid the
top rate was significantly less persuasive than the experts in
the remaining conditions."9 The expert in this condition was
also seen as by far the least honest.' 60
Cooper and Neuhaus explain the results as support
for the shift to peripheral processing in the face of cognitively
challenging testimony, producing a drop in persuasiveness
when the high pay level cued them that the expert was a less
trustworthy source."' Again, whether a shift to peripheral
processing occurred is somewhat ambiguous because no
measure of comprehension was taken. A competing explanation
is that the jurors centrally processed the testimony, but
rejected it when the expert's motives were suspect and his
presentation suggested that he might be trying to obfuscate. In
short, despite Cooper and his colleagues' conclusions that
jurors shift away from central processing to peripheral
processing of information when faced with complex expert
testimony, closer examination of the studies does not support
this conclusion.
An experiment by Margaret Kovera and her colleagues
was intended to test jurors' reasoning skills about the scientific
validity of expert evidence.'62 Subjects in their experiment
viewed a two and a half hour videotape of a simulated trial
'5 Id.
1 8 Id.
159 Id.
'Go Cooper & Neuhaus, supra note 150.
in Id.
1G2 Margaret B. Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects of
Juror Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment
Case, 84 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 362 (1999).
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involving a lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleged gender
discrimination due to a hostile work environment. The trial
simulation contained evidence about sexually suggestive
photographs in the work place, testimony from the plaintiff
that she was the target of unwelcome sexual advances, and
testimony from the defendants. For jurors in a control
condition the trial contained no expert testimony. Fcr other
jurors, however, an expert described research on factors that
increase the likelihood of sexual harassment in a workplace
and how a sexualized environment can lead to gender
discrimination. The experiment contained different versions of
the expert testimony. Some jurors heard that the research had
been published in a peer-reviewed journal and was cited in
major psychology texts while others heard that it had been
submitted but not yet published and had not been cited in
texts. In addition, the "ecological validity" of the research was
varied so that some jurors learned that the subjects in the
research were college students or instead that they were blue
collar employees in a company similar to the defendant
company. Third, the "construct validity" of the experiment was
varied, with some of the jurors learning that only a single
measure of sexual harassment was used while others learned
that the expert had used multiple measures that triangulated
on the construct of sexual harassment. Finally, the degree of
cross-examination of the expert was manipulated. In some
versions the cross-examination was not scientifically informed,
that is, it centered on such factors as whether the expert could
predict whether a man will be affected by sexually suggestive
ads and whether the expert was qualified to make a legal
determination about whether sexual harassment had occurred.
In contrast, a scientifically informed cross-examination
condition called attention to methodological features of the
study such as whether the subjects were college students or
real employees and whether the ratings of sexual harassment
had validity.
The effects of the expert testimony in the Kovera
163
experiment were more pronounced for male as opposed to
female jurors, possibly because women found the expert
evidence redundant with their own experience and attitudes.
'3 See Kovera et al., supra note 162.
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The research did find that jurors relied on certain cues as they
evaluated the expert evidence. The expert's research was
judged to be more trustworthy if it had been published. The
expert was judged to be more credible in conditions when her
subjects were similar to actual blue collar workers. However,
the jurors appeared to lack sensitivity to some important
factors that bore on the ability of the expert to draw
conclusions from the data that were collected.
Extrapolating from the Kovera conclusions may be
unwarranted, however, because the experiment did not contain
conditions in which the defendants called their own expert to
attempt to refute the plaintiffs expert, as would be likely in a
real trial. Some research evidence indicates that an opposing
expert is more effective in causing jurors to attend closely to
testimony than cross-examination alone."M Equally important,
the assumption of Kovera and her colleagues appears to have
been that jurors should not have given attention to the expert's
qualifications, an assumption that is contrary to the
instructions that jurors are given in actual trials.
B. Expert Evidence That May Be In Conflict With
Common Sense Justice
Norman Finkel has drawn attention to the fact that
some legal concepts, such as the insanity defense and self
defense, are often at variance with socio-cultural
understandings of mental states.6 ' A number of experiments
on the insanity defense strongly suggest that while jurors may
use expert evidence to evaluate insanity, their prior beliefs
may override or modify their interpretation of that evidence. In
a series of experiments involving testimony about the insanity
defense, Rita James Simon found that judicial instructions
under the M'Naughten rule or under the Durham test produced
no differences in verdicts.'66 In examining her data, Simon
'64 See generally BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); see also Brian
L. Cutler et al., Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: an Empirical Analysis, 7
BEHAV. ScI. & L. 215, 215-25 (1989).
'65 See generally FINKEL, supra note 35.
166 RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 183-201
(1967).
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concluded that while jurors do consider the judicial instruction
of the judge and the expert, they nevertheless construe the
evidence to comport with their intuitive or "common sense"
beliefs about what is insane and what is not.
Solomon Fulero and Finkel conducted an experiment
that varied the relation that the expert testimony bore to the
defendant's insanity claim."7 In some conditions the testimony
was only diagnostic, in others the testimony was directed
toward the penultimate issue of insanity, and in others it was
addressed directly to the ultimate issue bearing on the
verdict.' The experiment also varied whether experts testified
for the defense, the prosecution, both sides, or as neutrals.'69
The striking finding was that the form of testimony had no
effect on verdict patterns.7 The data indicated that a likely
explanation of the result is that the jurors interpreted the
testimony in light of their prior beliefs about insanity, causing
them to infer things about the expert's testimony that were
consistent with their prior beliefs."'
Phoebe Ellsworth and her colleagues presented jury-
eligible adults with summaries of murder cases involving an
insanity defense."72 Two of the cases involved a psychiatrist
testifying for the defendant about an organic disorder, either
mental retardation or psychomotor epilepsy, and the remaining
two cases involved diagnoses of schizophrenia, a disease that
undoubtedly has organic elements but ones which are harder to
identify 73 The study found that the testimony about the two
organic disease cases tended to be accepted by the jurors but
that persons who favored the death penalty were less likely to
accept the testimony involving schizophrenia."74
Caton Roberts and Golding also conducted
experiments that provided student and non-student samples of
subjects with cases involving expert testimony on insanity and
1C? Solomon M. Fulero & Norman J. Finkel, Barring Ultimate Issue Testimony:
An "Insane"Rule?, 15 LAW & HUIM. BEHAV. 495, 497 (1991).
"8 Id. at 500-01.
1i9 Id.
170 Id. at 504.
171 Id. at 505.
172 Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of
Insanity, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984).
17M Id. at 86-87.
174 Id. at 88-89.
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versions of judicial instructions involving verdict choices of "not
guilty by reason of insanity" and "guilty but mentally ill.""5
The experiments also varied the degree of planning that the
defendant used in committing the crime. Testimony on insanity
was less likely to be accepted for crimes that showed the
accused engaged in planning activities before the acts were
carried out. However, Roberts and Golding also concluded that
differences between persons in their moral and social
cognitions were as important as evidence and legal instructions
in affecting willingness to accept insanity defenses.
There are many other experimental studies that are
consistent with the theme of jurors using "common sense"
notions to judge expert evidence and judicial instructions.176
However, Finkel's program of research in this area is the most
complete."7 His findings over many experiments show that
evidence about a defendant's insanity is interpreted in the light
of jurors' own social-cognitive schemata of what constitutes
insane behavior."8
C. Social Framework Evidence
In 1973 in United States v. Amaral,' a federal appeals
court asserted that jurors may be unduly prejudiced, confused
or misled by expert testimony because of "its aura of special
reliability."8 ' The expert testimony that was rejected involved
a psychologist called to testify about the potential unreliability
of eyewitnesses to a bank robbery.' While psychiatrists and
psychologists have long testified about states of mind on the
175 Caton Roberts & Stephen Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal
Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 349 (1991).
17G See, e.g., Caton Roberts et al., Verdict Selection Processes in Insanity Cases:
Juror Construals and the Effects of Guilty But Mentally Ill Instructions, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 261 (1993);
'7 See generally FINKEL, supra note 35.
'7" Commonsense notions in other areas (e.g., a convicted murderer is likely to
be violent in the future) can also have a powerful influence on jurors' reactions to
expert testimony (e.g., a willingness to accept the prediction that the defendant is
certain to kill again). Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at
Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996).
17 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
1 Id. at 1152.
"s Id. at 1153.
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issues of insanity or diminished capacity, beginning around the
middle of the 1970s some courts began to allow psychologists
and other social scientists to give testimony about matters
involving what has been labeled "social framework" evidence.182
Today such evidence is admitted in many criminal and civil
trials, although not without controversy and concern.183 Social
framework evidence includes not only the subject of eyewitness
reliability but also battered woman syndrome, rape trauma
syndrome, child sex abuse syndrome, and a host of post-trauma
stress disorders, as well as reactions to discrimination or
harassment in work settings.' 4
Social framework testimony is different from
testimony in which a psychiatrist examines a defendant's
mental state.8 ' The testimony is based on findings from
general research. None of the subjects in the studies have any
connection to the parties in the trial. Rather, the expert is
testifying about findings that are only similar to the issues in
the case. The rationale for allowing the testimony is that jurors
may hold beliefs or stereotypes about eyewitness confidence,
rape, or domestic violence victims that are inaccurate.
Research shows, for example, that some jurors (and judges)
believe that there is a high correlation between eyewitness
confidence and accuracy, that actual rape victims are
hysterical immediately afterward, or that battered women
could leave the relationship if they wanted to.
Nevertheless, some courts and scholars have raised
legitimate concerns about such testimony. Many assert that
such testimony is more prejudicial than probative. That is, it
will cause the jurors to defer to the expert entirely, or at least
12 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477,488 (1986)
[hereinafter Monahan & Walker, Social Authority]; Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987)
[hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks].
183 Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Impact of Daubert and its
Progeny on the Admissibility of Behavioral and Social Science Evidence, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 4-5 (1999); see generally DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE chs. 8-13 (1997).
184 See Jane Goodman & Robert T. Croyle, Social Framework Testimony in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 7 BEHAV. SI. & L. 227, 227-28 (1989); see generally
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 183.
185 Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 182; Walker & Monahan,
Social Frameworks, supra note 182.
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give the opinion too much weight, ignore other evidence that
may be contrary, and improperly conclude that the eyewitness
is unreliable, that the rape victim's story is true, or that the
woman unquestionably believed that her life was in danger.
Additionally, in domestic violence cases concern has been
raised that the testimony will shift the jury's attention to the
character of the abuser rather than the legally proper state of
mind of the defendant. Some critics have further asserted that
allowing one party to introduce such evidence will require
allowing the other party to call counter-experts and that the
resulting "battle of experts" will entirely confuse the jury and
distract it from other trial evidence. Jury researchers have
produced a fairly sizeable number of experiments intended to
shed light on the impact of social framework testimony on
jurors and juries. Some articles in this body of research have
investigated the effects of factors that are often raised in the
debate about juries and experts.
Harmon Hosch reviewed three articles by different
researchers who studied the effects of expert evidence on
judgments about eyewitness reliability.86  Some of the
experiments involved individual jurors while others involved
deliberation. The subjects and trial materials differed
substantially among the studies, but they were similar in that
each study compared reactions to a crucial eyewitness with or
without testimony from an expert. Despite differences in the
way the studies were conducted, similar results were produced.
Testimony from an expert about research on eyewitness
reliability generated reductions in the jurors' beliefs about the
accuracy of the eyewitness."7 When jurors deliberated on the
evidence, mock jurors spent significantly longer times
discussing the eyewitness and other trial evidence in
conditions involving expert evidence than in those without
expert evidence. 8
"G Harmon N. Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies of the Influence of
Expert Testimony on Jurors, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 297, 297 (1980).
'8 Id. at 299.
"'8Id. at 300.
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Nearly a decade later, Brian Cutler and his
colleagues"8 9 conducted an experiment involving a realistic
videotaped criminal trial that included crucial and disputed
eyewitness evidence. As in the earlier studies, a critical part of
the research involved whether an expert did or did not testify
about eyewitness reliability. The expert testimony sensitized
jurors to variables related to the physical conditions under
which the eyewitness viewed the event.190 While jurors who
were exposed to the expert testimony gave less weight to
witness confidence, they gave more weight to witnessing and
identification conditions. The expert testimony did not cause
them to be generally more skeptical of eyewitness testimony.191
Nancy Brekke and Eugene Borgida conducted three
studies to explore how students used expert evidence about
group base rates in a simulated trial involving an acquaintance
rape."' The subjects rendered individual responses and
deliberated to a verdict in groups containing up to eight
members.193 During the trial, a psychiatrist testified that rates
of false accusations of rape are low, that rape is highly under-
reported, that a large proportion of rapes are acquaintance
rapes rather than stranger rapes, that rape is a crime of
violence, and that research indicates that to avoid additional
physical harm it is often better for a woman to submit rather
than resist.19 4 A body of psychological research with students,
professional persons (including judges), and non-professional
adults has shown that in making judgments, people tend to
underutilize information on base rates in their decision making
in deference to anecdotes and similar information.9 When the
testimony occurred early, as opposed to later, in the trial, and
when the information was illustrated concretely by having the
psychiatrist respond to a hypothetical example, the jurors were
0 See generally Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert
Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 LAw & HUi. BEHAV. 311 (1989).
'oo Id. at 323-25.
... Id. at 327-28.
'92 See generally Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert Psychological
Testimony in Rape Trials: A Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYcHOL. 372 (1988).
"' Id. at 373.
114 Id. at 374.
111 Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 123, 129-30, 137 (1980-81).
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more likely to use the information from the expert to interpret
case facts.'96
The third study assessed how the evidence was used in
group deliberations. Brekke and Borgida discovered that
although the juries hardly discussed the expert testimony per
se in the deliberations, it had an effect on interpretations of
other, evidence."i ' Thus, for example, in juries that were not
exposed to the expert evidence, the issue of victim resistance
was a dominant theme during deliberation. 9 ' It was not a
dominant theme in the juries exposed to expert testimony.'99 It
is noteworthy that expert testimony had no impact on the way
that the defendant was discussed or on the amount of time he
was discussed. Brekke and Borgida concluded that their data
showed that "jurors do not seem to automatically accept and
apply the testimony of an expert witness."' °
Brekke and her students conducted another
experiment, except that this time the subjects were 540 non-
student jurors who watched a videotaped rape trial and
deliberated to reach a verdict.' A number of features were
studied in the experiment, but an important factor involved
whether the experts were appointed by the court or called by
the contending parties. A control set of jurors did not hear the
expert testimony.2 Analysis of the deliberations revealed that
the jurors responded quite negatively to the adversarial battle
of experts but regarded the non-adversarial testimony no more
favorably than adversarial testimony. However, the results
also indicated that the jurors gave far greater scrutiny to the
expert testimony when it was presented in an adversarial
format, compared to when it was conveyed by a court-
appointed expert.2 0' The data suggested that the battle of
1. Brekke & Borgida, supra note 192, at 375.
197 Id. at 382.
19s Id.
199 Id.
210 Id. at 383.
20' Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed Experts: The Impact
of Nonadversarial versus Adversarial Expert Testimony, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 451,
457-58 (1991).
202 Id. at 468.
203 Id. at 470.
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experts, albeit evoking negative evaluations, produced better
juror scrutiny of what the experts had to say.0
Margaret Kovera and her colleagues investigated the
effects of syndrome evidence concerning child sex abuse. 5 The
expert evidence was presented in one of three forms: a
probabilistic match of the victim with typical characteristics of
sex abuse victims, an opinion of the child's credibility based on
case history, or an evaluation of the child using anatomically
detailed dolls. The jurors were less influenced by probabilistic
testimony in comparison to the other two forms.2 6 The research
also varied the strength of the cross examination of the expert,
but it had minimal effects on the jury.27 These findings appear
consistent with the other studies indicating that concrete
evidence is more persuasive than abstract probability evidence.
The effect of expert testimony about battered women
has been investigated in a series of studies by Regina
Schuller."' In one study, mock juries listened to an audio-taped
trial involving a woman who was charged with killing her
spouse but pleaded self-defense. Some of the juries heard one of
two versions of expert testimony about battered women
research findings while juries in a control condition heard the
evidence without expert testimony.0 9 Compared to the control
condition, the effect of the expert evidence was a moderate shift
from a second-degree murder verdict toward a verdict of the
lesser offense of manslaughter rather than to not guilty."0
Analysis of the taped jury deliberations indicated that the
expert evidence caused the jurors to attend more carefully to
testimony from the defendant involving her claim that she was
abused, that she feared for her life, and that she experienced a
20 Id. at 469.
205 Margaret B. Kovera et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:
Effects of Expert Evidence Type and Cross-Examination, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 653,
659(1994).
209 Id. at 653.
' Id. at 665.
208 See Regina A. Schuller, The Impact of Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence
on Jury Decision Processes, 16 LAw & HUMI. BEHAV. 597, 600-14 (1992); Regina A.
Schuller & Janice Cripps, Expert Evidence Pertaining to Battered Women: The Impact
of Gender of Expert and Timing of Testimony, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 17, 17-31 (1998);
see also Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 152-54 (1989).
209 Schuller, supra note 208, at 609-14.
210 Schuller, supra note 208, at 615.
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loss of control over her actions.2 ' The juries devoted very little
deliberation time to explicit consideration of the expert
testimony except when points of contention arose between
jurors. On those occasions jurors used the expert testimony to
back up contentions favorable to the defendant.212 Expert
testimony caused the jurors to center on the defendant's
testimony but, compared to the no expert condition, that
testimony had no effect on the discussion of other evidence.213
In a systematic review of research on these various
forms of social framework evidence, Vidmar and Schuller
concluded that jurors used social framework testimony by
incorporating the information into their decision-making
processes.2" However, the jurors were not seduced by it. They
critically evaluated the information and did not accord it an
unwarranted aura of trustworthiness and reliability or allow
the expert's opinion to substitute for their own judgment.2 5 In
addition, the accumulated data from the studies showed only a
very modest spillover effect on the way the jurors evaluated
other evidence in the case, including judgments about the
credibility or character of other witnesses."6
D. Experimental Research: A Summary
In most respects, the experimental research related to
juries and experts produces conclusions consistent with the
studies involving juror interviews. Although jurors have
greater difficulty with probabilistic and statistical evidence,
there is little evidence that they are simply impressed by
jargon and awed by experts' credentials to the point that they
are overwhelmed by and uncritical of the testimony. Nor is
there evidence that they simply ignore complex expert
testimony. Although jurors struggle and are occasionally
misled, they generally make reasonable use of complex
material, utilizing the expert testimony when it is presented in
211 Schuller, supra note 208, at 613-14.
212 Schuller, supra note 208, at 612.
213 Schuller, supra note 208, at 612.
214 Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 208, at 171.
215 Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 208, at 173.
21G Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 208, at 174.
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a form that they can use. Their struggles suggest that there is
room for improvement in the way that complex material is
presented, and that advocates and experts who fail to address
this need may, as a result, fail to persuade jurors that the
testimony they are offering should be accepted.
V. THE ISSUE OF JUDGES VERSUS JURIES
Implicitly in the Daubert line of cases and explicitly in
Allison v. McGhan217 and in Marcia Angell's book on the breast
implant cases, there is an assumption that judges have the
skills to understand and interpret expert evidence, or at least
they have better skills than twelve or six laypersons who
compose juries. Similarly, Joseph Sanders' careful research on
the Bendectin cases suggests that juries were confused in a
way that perhaps judges would not have been. Although it is
not possible to prove that the assumption made by these
commentators is wrong, there is good reason to at least call it
into question.
Let us return to the Hendrickson aconitine poisoning
case for a matter that we intentionally left out of the story:
Professor Lee's condemnation of the jury system for being
unreasonably influenced by superficial characteristics of the
experts who testified about aconitine for the prosecution. Lee
ignored the high probability that if the trial had been
conducted by the judge alone, the outcome would likely have
been the same. As described by James Mohr, who researched
the Hendrickson case:
In his unusually lengthy remarks at the sentencing, Judge Marvin
underlined his belief that "science advances-as it unfolds to the
student the great storehouse of knowledge, and lets man penetrate
into the very arcana of nature." In Hendrickson's case, Marvin
asserted, science had made another advance, for it was science that
detected a previously undetectable poison and it was science that
"unerringly" pointed Hendrickson out as the guilty individual. He
hoped that the trial would have a salutary effect on public opinion
and cut down on the number of murders. "In this day of light" no one
217 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999).
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could commit murder "without leaving the evidence of guilt." The
practitioners and processes of medical jurisprudence would find
them out.
218
A strikingly similar failure to consider how judges
might have decided some of the breast implant cases is also
evident in Marcia Angell's condemnation of the jury in Science
on Trial.219 In her epilogue to chapter six on "Science in the
Courtroom," Angell quoted from Judge Proctor Hug, who
presided over a three judge appeals court panel in Hopkins v.
Dow Corning Corporation:220 "Dow's conduct in exposing
thousands of women to a painful and debilitating disease, and
the evidence that Dow gained financially from its conduct, may
properly be considered in imposing an award of punitive
,,121damages. Indeed, in Angell's own description of the case, the
panel accepted the testimony of all three expert witnesses who
testified on behalf of the plaintiff.222 Angell's analysis ignores
the fact that the presiding judges in some of the silicone breast
implant trials entered judgments approving the jury verdict.2"
In contrast to the above empirically unsupported
assertions about the inferiority of juries compared to judges,
Sanders' interviews with the jurors in the Havner case
involving Bendectin did strongly suggest that they were
confused about the expert testimony. Nevertheless, his
dissection of the Havner case also led him to conclude that the
jurors' problems may have stemmed from the way that the
evidence was presented, from poor instructions from the judge,
from restrictions imposed by the rules of evidence, and from
the adversary system itself, which influenced the way cases
were litigated.2 4 In short, the problems that arose may not
have been caused by intellectual inadequacies of the jurors.
Additionally, his research on that case and other cases
indicates that despite emerging evidence in the general
scientific community that Bendectin was not a teratogen, some
of the trial judges refused to grant summary judgment for the
218 MOHR, supra note 1, at 131.
219 See generally ANGELL, supra note 10.
220 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994).
22' ANGELL, supra note 10, at 111.
222 Id. at 124.
223 We have not attempted a count of these cases.
224 SANDERS, sutpra note 37, at 108-16; Sanders, supra note 105, at 58.
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defense225 and at least some apparently were in agreement with
the jury verdict.226
Many judges and lawyers humorously assert that they
went to law school because they did not have the brains to
become doctors or scientists. This modest self-assessment
should not detract from the fact that most judges are highly
intelligent people who understand their chosen field of law
very well, but the humor does perhaps contain more than a
grain of truth with respect to understanding science. After all,
in complicated fields like DNA, epidemiology, or chemistry,
judges are also laypersons. A well-known case helps to
illustrate this point.
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation" was a
products liability case involving a plaintiff born with severe
birth defects after her mother used a contraceptive spermicide
known as Ortho-Gynol Contraceptive Jelly.22 The parties
agreed to have the case tried by a single judge without a jury.
After hearing all the evidence, the judge found for the plaintiff
and awarded her $5.1 million in damages. The judge explained
his opinion in detail, including how he evaluated the evidence
tendered by the experts for both sides. The judge stated:
[T]he Court considered each expert's background, training,
experience and familiarity with the circumstances of this particular
case; and the Court evaluated the rationality and internal
consistency of each expert's testimony in light of all the evidence
presented. The Court paid close attention to each expert's demeanor
and tone. Perhaps most important, the Court did its best to
ascertain the motives, biases 29and interests that might have
influenced each expert's opinion.
He went on to state that he found the plaintiffs
experts to be competent, credible, and directed to the specific
circumstances of the case, whereas the testimony of the
defendant's experts often indicated bias or inconsistency." ° The
SANDERS, supra note 37, at 143-74.
2' SANDERS, supra note 37, at 159, tbl. 16.
22 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
22 Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985),
affd and modified in part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied 479 U.S. 950
(1986).
Id. at 267.
220 Id.
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judge concluded that one critical plaintiff expert exhibited
"excellent" demeanor; demonstrated "a careful, methodological
reasoning process"; and answered all questions "fairly and
openly" and translated technical terms into "common
understandable language."231 In contrast, the judge asserted
that one defense witness, despite having impressive
credentials, was not a "credible witness" because of the
"absolute terms" in which he expressed his opinions."2 The
judge also stated that the defense pxpert's opinions suggested
an "unwarranted degree of confidence." Furthermore, that
expert's "criticisms of plaintiffs attorneys and of expert
witnesses who testify for plaintiffs in malformation lawsuits
strongly suggest a distinct prejudice."23
Thus, the judge, as Samuel Gross has written,
produced a clear, detailed, and carefully reasoned judgment-a
model of what a judge is supposed to do. 4 In the face of
conflicting evidence, he relied upon the same legal instructions
about consistency and demeanor that are given to juries.
Unfortunately, he was dead wrong. At the time of the trial, the
issue had been extensively examined by the medical profession
and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), yielding a
conclusion that the spermicide did not cause birth defects.23
The judge actually knew about these conclusions, but
discounted them because one of the defense experts had served
as a consultant to the FDA panel of scientists that investigated
the spermicide controversy.3 6
Wells' experiment, discussed earlier, which compared
the ability of judges and jurors to make correct inferences from
probability data, indicated that both groups performed poorly,
and specifically indicated that judges were not superior to
jurors.37 A series of case studies by a panel of the National
Research Council also demonstrated that judges
misinterpreted statistical information."S Richard Lempert has
'1 Id. at 273.
22 Id. at 291.
Wells, 615 F. Supp. at 291.
24 Gross, Expert Evidence, supra note 21.
2" Gross, Expert Evidence, supra note 21, at 279.
2' Gross, Expert Evidence, supra note 21, at 294.
237 Wells, supra note 112.
238 See generally THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
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also conducted case studies of judges who got the data wrong. 9
Similarly, against the background of evidence that laypersons
are influenced by cognitive illusions that affect their decision
making, Chris Guthrie and his colleagues have shown that
judges are influenced by the same cognitive illusions:
anchoring (making estimates based on irrelevant starting
points), framing effects (treating gains and losses differently),
hindsight bias (perceiving past events to have been more
predictable than they actually were), representativeness
(ignoring important background statistical information in favor
of individuating information), and egocentric biases
(overestimating one's own abilities)." °
However, the most compelling data of all come from a
recently completed study by Sophia Gatowski and her
colleagues involving 400 state court trial judges from all fifty
states who had dockets likely to include the types of evidence
raised by Daubert.241 A sampling frame was used to obtain a
representative sample of these judges. A detailed survey was
developed that consisted of two parts. The first part focused on
the admissibility standards in the judge's state, the judge's
perception of the appropriateness and value of the Daubert
standards, a series of additional questions about perceptions of
the functioning of the legal system, and the judge's definition of
certain kinds of expert testimony as "scientific" or as "technical
or otherwise specialized knowledge." The second part focused
on the judge's level of experience with specific types of
scientific evidence and the judge's general techniques for
managing scientific evidence. The scientific evidence included
the so-called "hard sciences" as well as psychological evidence.
The surveys were conducted by telephone and in some
instances partly by a mail-form of the instrument. The
telephone interviews averaged fifty-five minutes in length.
29 Richard Lempert, Befuddled Judges: Statistical Evidence in Title VII
Cases, in Controversies In Civil Rights (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
240 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind: Heuristics and Biases, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001).
24' Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: Results of a National
Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW &
HUi. BEHAV. 433 (2001).
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An important part of the survey was directed toward
assessing the judge's understanding of criteria enunciated in
Daubert, specifically, testing and falsifiability, error rates, peer
review and publication, and general acceptance of the scientific
community. Interviewers asked the judges how they would
apply a specific criterion. The judge was then asked to explain
his or her understanding of each criterion. If the judge asked
for a definition or clarification, the interviewer provided a
scientifically correct definition of the criterion. The judges'
responses were subsequently checked against pre-determined
standards for accurate understanding.
The study found that the judges overwhelmingly
endorsed the gate-keeping role for the judge regardless of
whether their state followed Daubert or Frye guidelines. Few of
the judges reported having experience with epidemiological
evidence: seventy-three percent reported no experience at all.
Two-thirds reported at least some experience with DNA
evidence in their court, and eighty percent reported at least
some experience with psychological evidence, with twenty-two
percent reporting a great deal of experience. Sixty-three
percent of the judges reported that they had received CLE
training about the use of specific types of evidence, but fully
ninety-six percent reported that they had not received
instruction about general scientific methods and principles.
Nevertheless, fifty-two percent of the judges said that their
education had prepared them to deal with the range of
scientific evidence that judges were likely to face, while the
remainder said they felt inadequately prepared. These opinions
about being prepared, however, need to be compared to how
well the judges understood the scientific criteria enunciated in
Daubert.
The first criterion listed by the Daubert court was
falsifiability, that is, the ability of the expert's theory to be
empirically tested against plausible alternative explanations.
Eighty-eight percent of the judges asserted that falsifiability
was a useful decision-making tool. Nevertheless, their answers
in attempting to explain falsifiability revealed that only four
percent of them could provide an explanation that involved a
clear understanding of falsifiability. In fact, thirty-five percent
of the judges gave answers that were unequivocally wrong. The
second Daubert criterion was error rate, and ninety-one
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percent indicated that error rate was a useful criterion. Yet,
similar to the falsifiability findings, only four percent
demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept, while
eighty-six percent gave answers that can be classified at best
as equivocal and ten percent gave an answer that was
inaccurate. With respect to the utility of the peer review
process, seventy-one percent of judges clearly understood that
concept, but ten percent clearly did not. Finally, eighty-two
percent of the respondents demonstrated a clear understanding
of the general acceptance criterion. The ability of judges to
answer these questions did not differ between those who
resided in states that followed Daubert rules and those that
followed Frye rules.
Falsifiability and error rates are often critical to
understanding the processes underlying an expert's scientific
opinion, but the Gatowski study raises important questions
about the ability of judges to evaluate the validity of the
expert's methodology. It may be that when the expert testifies
in person and the methodology is placed in its specific context,
the judges might be able to exhibit better understanding.
Nevertheless, the findings of this important study appear
generally consistent with the case studies and the Wells
experiment. At minimum, they offer a challenge to
assumptions about the competence of judges to judge science.
The data from the case studies and the Gatowski
survey do not speak to the competence of jurors. It is highly
improbable that a random sample of jurors could perform any
better than the judges performed on the survey task. In fact,
they might well perform much worse, especially on the criteria
of peer review and general acceptance. On the other hand, if
individual judges or groups of twelve or six deliberating jurors
heard the same scientific evidence in the context of the specific
trial, whether one set of respondents would be demonstrably
superior to the other remains an unanswered empirical
question. It is worth observing, however, that if some members
of the juries had scientific or technical training, the odds of
superior performance might be tipped in favor of the juries.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It seems clear from this review that claims about jury
incompetence and irresponsibility in assessing and considering
the testimony of scientific experts are not supported by
research findings. There is a consistent convergence in juror
interview studies and experimental studies involving both civil
and criminal juries. Jurors appear motivated to critically
assess the content of the expert's testimony and weigh it in the
context of the other trial evidence, as they are instructed to do.
They appear to understand the nature of the adversary
process, at least in the context of their specific trial. Even
though many jurors may not have had prior exposure to the
trial process, it appears that they develop an understanding
from the give and take of examination and cross-examination
and exposure to opposing experts. Indeed, rather than simply
deferring automatically to experts, as critics have claimed, the
trial process appears to make them aware of the fallibility of
expert testimony. This is not to say that every juror is
motivated and grasps the expert testimony, because the data
seldom shed light on the thought processes of individual jurors,
but the deliberation process appears to result in closer
examination of diverging views and understandings-just as
the legal system assumes it does.
Much comment has been made about juries giving
attention to the credentials of experts, with the assertion that
juries are behaving improperly when they do so. However,
critics of juries have tended to ignore the instructions that
jurors are given, namely, that credentials and experience are to
be taken into account in evaluating the credibility of witnesses.
Moreover, the experimental studies by Cooper and his
associates242 (that have claimed that jurors give inappropriate
attention to credentials) turn out, upon closer examination, to
have ignored these legal considerations. In fact, their studies
contain findings that contradict their conclusions.
The findings that jurors evaluate expert testimony in
the context of other evidence, and follow the judge's instruction
to evaluate it in light of their own experience and common
242 See generally Cooper et al., supra note 144; Cooper and Neuhaus, supra
note 150.
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sense, may have particularly important ramifications with
respect to certain types of psychological and psychiatric
testimony, particularly with respect to insanity defenses. On
the one hand, the research findings suggest that while jurors
may not ignore psychiatric testimony, they are especially prone
to evaluate it in light of their common sense notions of insanity
and criminal responsibility. It is possible that the strong
societal values implicated in serious criminal trials make
jurors especially prone to give heavy weight to their prior
beliefs in evaluating psychological data. On the other hand, the
research on social framework evidence does indicate that jurors
are susceptible to having their prior beliefs modified, or at least
to evaluating evidence differently than they would without
expert testimony. Although more research needs to be
conducted, the Schklar and Diamond findings243 about how
laypersons incorporate prior beliefs and expectations in
evaluating DNA evidence show reactions similar to the
findings about the insanity defense.
With a few exceptions, the experimental literature has
focused primarily on scientific, medical, or psychological
evidence, as opposed to other forms of expert evidence, such as
the technical evidence about tire failure analysis that was the
specific issue in Kumho.' More research on these other forms
of testimony is needed. Some forms of technical (i.e., non-
science) evidence may be more familiar to jurors than others,
and we would expect that in the former instances, jurors will
evaluate expert testimony differently than in the latter
instances because they will have available and will utilize
different cognitive tools in evaluating it.
Insofar as it can be assessed, there is no evidence that
juries are incompetent to evaluate expert testimony. While
some research on juries and on human reasoning in other
settings suggests that laypersons have difficulty properly
weighing abstract probabilities and other statistical evidence,
the research by Nisbett and his colleagues24 provides an
important clue as to why complicated expert evidence may not
be as great a problem as some commentators have feared: the
243 See Schklar & Diamond, supra note 35.
244 526 U.S. at 142-47.
2's Nisbett et al., supra note 51, at 297-98.
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essence of the testimony can often be presented in concrete
ways so that a layperson can grasp the essentials of the
testimony. The medical malpractice case involving urinary
incontinence described earlier24 6 involved complicated medical
testimony, but from the very opening of evidence the jurors
were tutored by the doctors and then exposed to cross-
examination. Although some jurors described the repetition as
boring, it was also clear that some members of the jury
understood it. 247 And these jurors took the lead in deliberations.
Lawyers can and often do hire expert witnesses on the basis of
their ability to communicate, and lawyers prepare witnesses
with communication in mind.248
The findings discussed in this review also appear
consistent with legal instructions and the story model of jury
decision making.2 49 They indicate that jurors tend to integrate
expert testimony in light of their prior "common sense"
experience and in reaching a verdict weigh that evidence in the
context of the other evidence. It bears repeating that despite
the presence of expert testimony, in many cases that testimony
is only one part of the evidence. A crucial part of the trial often
hinges on the timing and actions of the involved parties: who
did what when, and who is the most credible of opposing
civilian and expert witnesses. These issues have often been
obscured by simple claims about bewildered juries without
taking into consideration the jury instructions and the totality
of trial evidence.
Put in a broader context, these conclusions are
consonant with other sources of data on jury performance.
Several studies have asked trial judges to report what their
verdict would have been on the issue of liability if they had
decided the case in a bench trial.20 The studies showed high
24 See VIDMAR, supra note 60, at 127.
247 Id.
218 Joseph Sanders et al., Trial Lawyer Perceptions of Expert Knowledge, Paper
presented at the Annual Meetings of the Law and Society Association, New Orleans,
Louisiana, May 2000 (transcript on file with authors).
29 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 53, at 320-33.
25 Paula Hannaford et al., Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact
of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2000); Larry Heuer & Steven
Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of its Meaning and Effects, 18 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 29, 49 (1994); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.
REV. 1055, 1063-65 (1964).
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levels of agreement between judge and jury, even when the
judge rated the trial evidence as difficult. Surveys of judges
regarding their general opinion of the performance of juries
also show high levels of agreement that juries are both diligent
and competent."' Several other studies have compared
confidential assessments of negligence made by physicians
acting in a neutral capacity with the liability verdicts of juries
that decided medical malpractice cases. 2 These studies
showed high levels of agreement between the physicians and
juries. All of the above studies and surveys were concerned
with the final verdict and did not specifically consider experts
per se. Nevertheless, experts would have proffered testimony
in most of the trials. At the very least, these studies lend no
support to the view that jury verdicts are led astray by expert
testimony, and a more generous interpretation-and a
reasonable one-is that juries reach the right decisions from
the totality of evidence, including expert evidence.
The research on judges and their understanding of
expert testimony is far more limited than that on juries.
Nevertheless, the data that do exist raise questions about
broad claims that judges would be superior to juries. As a
group, judges do not appear to be particularly sophisticated in
understanding probability statistics or scientific method. As
the Hendrickson case and judicial decisions in mass tort trials,
like the Bendectin cases, helped to demonstrate, trial judges
and even appellate judges sometimes appear to arrive at the
same decision as the jury in highly complicated cases. We do
not take the position that the juries understood the expert
evidence in these cases, but only raise the question about the
superiority of the judge. In both the Hendrickson trial and the
Bendectin cases that Sanders investigated, it must be
remembered that the jury decisions appear clearly
questionable only in the light of subsequent scientific
investigation. In the Bendectin cases, judges allowed trials to
27 See Neil Vidmar et al., Amicus Brief. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, reprinted
in 24 LAw & HUmi. BEHAV. 387, 390-91 (2000).
252 FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 92-122 (1993);
Henry Farber & Michelle White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of
the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199 (1991); Mark A. Taragin et al., The
Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 780 (1992).
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go forward and allowed expert evidence to be tendered even
after there were strong indications that Bendectin was not a
teratogen. Indeed, Sanders was fully cognizant that the
problem lay elsewhere. He concluded that in complicated cases,
juries will have difficulty in separating good from bad science.
But, he also wrote "marginal science is not the primary source
of jury difficulties with complex scientific arguments. The heart
of that problem lies not in the complexities of science but
rather in the structures and process of adversarial adjudication
that systematically disadvantage the cultural values of
science.""3 Sanders proposed modifying current procedures to
include court-appointed experts and bifurcated and even
polyfurcated trials.
Sanders' recommendations with respect to highly
complicated expert testimony leads us to a final issue. Even
though the data strongly suggest that in ordinary trials jurors
competently deal with expert evidence, improvements in trial
procedures could increase their performance potential. Some
improvement can be made by lawyers in giving greater
attention to preparing witnesses to provide more concrete,
albeit necessarily accurate, analogues, models, and metaphors
to assist laypersons in grasping complex concepts. In addition
to the research of Nisbett and his colleagues, there is a
collateral body of research addressed to improving jurors'
understanding of legal instructions.254 That research shows
that by giving closer attention to issues such as syntax and
grammar, significant improvements in jury comprehension
often result.
Then there are procedural modifications to the trial
itself that can aid in jury comprehension and understanding.
There are many possible innovations beyond the neutral
experts and bifurcated trials suggested by Sanders. The study
SANDERS, supra note 37, at 211.
See generally AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal
Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1306 (1979); Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions
on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996); Joel D.
Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 589 (1997); Laurence J. Severance &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 153 (1982-83).
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by ForsterLee and her colleagues" showed that a written
synopsis of the expert's testimony, particularly when provided
to jurors before the expert testified, enhanced their
understanding. 6 This finding is consistent with social schema
research and the story model of jury behavior in that jurors are
thus provided mental categories which help them assess the
information more easily. Another suggested reform is having
opposing experts testify back to back rather than following the
traditional adversary system practice of each side presenting
its case separately.17 This would allow the jurors to more easily
see points of conflict and agreement. However, both written
expert summaries and back to back testimony have limitations
which will not allow their implementation in many trials.
Arizona has instituted a number of procedural reforms
that include informing jurors that they may ask questions of
witnesses by communicating them in writing to the judge and
allowing jurors to discuss evidence at breaks and other times
instead of being instructed to wait until deliberations begin."
The rationale behind the reforms is that jurors do have
questions and that being able to discuss the evidence as it
occurs will aid in comprehension because it is fresh and in
some instances it will assist the jurors in formulating questions
to address to the witness. 9 The present authors are just
completing data collection in a study involving videotaping of
actual jury deliberations in a project intended to assess the
effects of these innovations in procedure.260 While we cannot, at
ForsterLee et al., supra note 119, at 267.
256 Although it is intended for another purpose, namely facilitation of pretrial
disclosure, FED R. CIv. P. 26(B) requires a written report from an expert about the
opinions he or she will express and the basis for the reasons. These reports could easily
be modified to assist the jury.
257 JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997).
2s Hannaford et al., supra note 250; see generally Michael Dann, "Learning
Lessons" and 'Speaking Rights"." Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.
J. 1229 (1993); Harold Lee Schwab, Innovative Trial Procedures for the Twenty-First
Century, 29 NYSBA TORTS, INS. & COMPENSATION L. SEC. J. 25, 30-31 (2000).
29 An objection to these reforms, especially question asking, is that they
remove some control of the case from the lawyers and thus compromise adversary
procedure. This is essentially true, although in earlier periods in both England and the
United States, and well after the development of the jury as an independent fact
finder, jurors were active participants in the trial. See, e.g., WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 13-
18 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000).
""' There have been other studies of the reforms by means of administering
post-trial questionnaires to jurors. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil
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this time, offer any conclusions about benefits or liabilities of
the reforms, preliminary data analyses do show that jurors
often do have questions about the testimony tendered by the
experts who testify at trial. Many of their questions relate to
the clarification of terminology, the procedures used by experts
to arrive at their conclusions, potentially missing data, and the
validity of the expert's inferences from the data. We hope
eventually to be able to assess the effects of these questions on
the quality of their understanding of the evidence. But even at
this very early stage our data seem very consistent with the
other findings reviewed in this article, namely, that jurors tend
to be involved, active processors of expert evidence.
Still more needs to be learned about how jurors
respond to various forms of expert evidence and about
procedures that can enhance jury understanding of
complicated evidence. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to close
this review by once again stating our basic conclusion.
Empirical data do not support a view that juries are passive,
too-credulous, incompetent, and overawed by the mystique of
the expert.
Vidmar, The Civil Jury at Work: A Study of Discussions and Deliberations by Real
Juries (National Science Foundation Grant, Jan. 1, 1999); Hannaford et al., supra note
250.
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